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Multinational Regulation of MNE 
Labor Relations 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Recently, multinational business enterprises have taken a powerful position 
in the world order. Their economic significance has provoked an international 
debate over the control and regulation of such powerful business enterprises 
and their activities. A balance is needed to reconcile the interests of Multina-
tional Enterprises! (MNE) and the nations affected by MNE activities. 
Because MNE activities affect trade, development financing, technology, in-
dustrialization, agriculture and employment, 2 virtually every important inter-
national organization concerned with international trade and investment has 
studied the problems and effects of MNEs.3 Two international organizations 
have issued codes of conduct with regard to MNEs.4 Although the business 
community believes that MNEs are now under control,5 and international 
businesses have generally agreed to abide by local desires,6 discussions con-
cerning further regulations continue. The most notable of these discussions 
1. A Multinational Enterprise is, for discussion purposes, a company that "extends its 
business operations under one guiding direction to two or more countries," and that has "influ-
ence and power in its own markets." Galbraith, The Difense of the Multinational Company, 56 HARV. 
Bus. REV. 83, 84, 86 (March-April 1978) [hereinafter cited as Galbraith]. The definition is 
treated in more detail infra § V.B, in connection with a discussion of the regulation of the MNE. 
2. 1 MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS LAW: THE U.N. AND TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS 
§ A, at 1 (K. Simmonds ed. 1980). 
3. This includes the United Nations, the International Labor Organization (ILO), the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the European Economic 
Communities (EEC) and the Organization of American States (OAS). 
4. Annex to the Declaration of 21st June, 1976 by Governments of OECD: Member Coun-
tries on International Investment and Multinational Enterprises, O.E.C.D. Doc. 21 (76) 0411, 
75 DEP'T STATE BULL. 83, 83-88 (1976) reprinted in 15 INT'L LEG. MAT. 967, 969 [hereinafter 
cited as OECD Guidelines]; The International Labor Organization: Tripartite Declaration of Principles 
Concerning Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy of November 16, 1977, reprinted in 17 INT'L LEG. 
MAT. 422 (1978) [hereinafter cited as!LO Tripartite Declaration]. 
5. See Multinationals: EEC Industries Opposed, EUROPE No. 2931, at 15, Jun. 18, 1980 [herein-
after cited as EEC Industries Opposed). 
6. See Guertin, A Business View on the Implementation of Codes of Conduct, in LEGAL PROBLEMS OF 
CODES OF CONDUCT FOR MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES 295, 298 (N. florn ed. 1980), expressing 
a general support by the business community for codes of conduct and the adherence to local 
desires implicit in those codes [hereinafter cited as Guertin]. See also Vagts, The Multinational 
Enterprise: A New Challenge for Transnational Law, 83 HARV. L. REV. 739, 745 (1970) [hereinafter 
cited as V agts]. 
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are being conducted in the United Nations7 and in the European Economic 
Communities. 8 
One area of debate involves employment and industrial relations. 9 This 
area is controversial because a MNE, as a provider of jobs, creates a natural 
tension between itself and local labor organizations. Tension arises from the 
MNE's desire for cheap labor and from the fact that a MNE's decisions often 
are made outside the countries affected by such decisions. 10 Workers, on the 
other hand, want security and a voice in improving living and working condi-
tions. 1I Therefore, organized labor has strongly supported regulation of 
MNEs12 to protect the interests of labor .13 
This Comment will explore the regulation of MNEs within one of the most 
strongly organized labor centers in the world, 14 the European Economic Com-
munity (EEC).15 In the EEC, industrial relations are characterized by a broad 
base of union membershipl6 and a trend towards industrial democracy. 17 
7. &e generally H. Baade, Codes of Conduct for Multinational Enterprises: An Introductory Survey, in 
LEGAL PROBLEMS OF CODES OF CONDUCT FOR MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES 407, 416-22 (N. 
Horn ed. 1980) [hereinafter cited as Baade). See e.g. TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS: CODE OF 
CONDUCT FORMULATIONS BY THE CHAIRMAN, U.N. Doc. E/C 10/AC 218, reprinted in 1 THECTC 
REPORTER NO.6, at 5 (1979). 
8. Infra § V. 
9. Other areas ofMNE conduct that are also the subject ofthe OECD Guidelines are financial 
and commercial operations, unfair competition, taxation, licensing and transfer of science and 
technology. See generally OECD Guidelines, supra note 4. 
10. &e NORTH-SOUTH: A PROGRAM FOR SURVIVAL (Report of the Independent Commission 
on Int'l Development Issues) 187-90 (W. Brandt ed. 1980) [hereinafter cited as NORTH-SOUTH). 
&e also Cox, Labor and the Multinationals, 54 FOREIGN AFF. 344, 347-48 (1976) [hereinafter cited as 
Cox); Baade, supra note 7, at 415. 
11. &e generally Murphy, Multinational Corporations and Free Coordinated Transnational Bargaining: 
An Alternative to Protectionism? 28 LAB. L. J. 619 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Murphy). 
12. &e generally Pursey, The Trade Union View on the Implementation of Codes of Conduct, in LEGAL 
PROBLEMS OF CODES OF CONDUCT FOR MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES 277 (N. Horn ed. 1980) 
[hereinafter cited as Pursey); see By Giving Support to the OECD Guidelines (a TUAC statement 
to the OECD committee, Apr. II, 1978) reprinted in R. BLANPAlN, THEOECD GUIDELINES FOR 
MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES AND LABOUR RELATIONS: 1976-1979, at 103 (1979) [hereinafter 
cited as BLANPAlN: TUAC Statement). TUAC is the Trade Union Advisory Committee to the 
OECD. 
13. Cox, supra note 10, at 355. 
14. &e id., at 356. For a discussion ofEEC activities with respect to protection oflaborinterest 
vis-a-vis MNEs, see Baade, supra note 7, at 422-24. 
15. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Communities, 295 U.N.T.S. 2 (German). 
The official English version is reprinted in [1973) Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 1 (Cmd. 5179-11) 
[hereinafter cited as EEC Treaty). At present, the members of the EEC are Belgium, Denmark, 
France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and 
the United Kingdom. ld. 
16. Cox, supra note 10, at 356. 
17 .. &e Malawer, Labor Law in the Common Market - Worker Participation and Other Recent 
Developments, 11 NEW ENG. L. REV. 55 (1975); see generally Note, Employee Codetermination: Origins in 
Germany, Present Practice in Europe, and Applicability to the United States, 14 HARV. J. LEGIS. 947 
(1977) [hereinafter cited as Employee Codetermination); see generally Creighton, The Bullock Report -
The Coming of Age of Democracy 4 BRIT. J. L. & SOCIETY 1 (1977). 
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However, even in the EEC, where labor has proposed binding regulations,18 
control of a MNE's industrial relations is difficult. 19 This difficulty results, in 
large part, from a MNE's ability to make decisions outside of the EEC coun-
tries. 20 
This Comment closely examines an attempt, which European lawmakers 
are currently making within the EEC regulatory structure to balance a MNE' s 
ability to make decisions with a commensurate responsibility to its work-
force .• 21 Proposed legislation, a Proposal for a Directive on Procedures for lriforming 
and Consulting the Employees of Undertakings with Complex Structures, in Particular 
Transnational Undertakings22 (Multinational Directive), is intended to 
mechanically achieve this balance in two ways: (1) by requiring disclosure of 
relevant information and (2) by requiring consultation before implementation 
of any decision having a substantial impact on workers' jobs. 23 Although the 
proposed Multinational Directive24 is in the earliest stages of the EEC 
legislative process,25 it is significant. The eventual application of these 
substantive requirements will create a new balance in the relative bargaining 
positions of labor and the management of MNEs. 
18. Information on and Evaluation of the Proposal of the EC Commission for a Directive, Decision of the 
Executive Committee, (Brussels, Dec. 4, 1980) § 1.1 (press release from European Trade Union 
Confederation (ETUC) EP/CL 8. 12. 1980) [hereinafter cited as ETUC Evaluation]. 
19. Van Langendonck, Procedures for Informing and Consulting Workers in Multinational Undertak-
ings - Legal and Practical Aspects in the EEC Member States Together with Greece and Switzerland 2 (EEC 
MONOGRAPH V/770/80/EN, 1980) [hereinafter cited as Van Langendonck]. 
20. See EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM, PROPOSAL FOR A DIRECTIVE ON PROCEDURES FOR IN· 
FORMING AND CONSULTING THE EMPLOYEES OF UNDERTAKINGS WITH COMPLEX STRUCTURES, IN 
PARTICULAR TRANSNATIONAL UNDERTAKINGS (submitted to the Council by the Commission), 
COM (80) 423 final, § I(A)(3) reprinted in [1980] BULL. EUR. COMM. (Supp. 3/80) 5 (1980) [here-
inafter cited as EXPLANATORY MEMO]. See Van Langendonck, supra note 19, at 3. 
21. See EXPLANATORY MEMO, supra note 20, § I(A)(4), at 2. 
22. PROPOSAL FOR A DIRECTIVE ON PROCEDURES FOR INFORMING AND CONSULTING THE 
EMPLOYEES OF UNDERTAKINGS WITH COMPLEX STRUCTURES, IN PARTICULAR TRANSNATIONAL 
UNDERTAKINGS, COM (80) 423 final (submitted to the Council by the Commission, Oct. 23, 
1980) [hereinafter cited as MULTINATIONAL DIRECTIVE]. 
23. See Business Brief, Business/Union Polarization 715 EUROPEAN REPORT (press release of the 
European Communities) 3, 4-5 (Sept. 30, 1980) [hereinafter cited as Business/Union Polarization]. 
24. MULTINATIONAL DIRECTIVE, COM (80) 423 final. 
25. The European Parliament and the Economic and Social Committee will consider the pro-
posal and then the EEC Commission will hold consultations with those organizations. The Com-
mission expects subsequent clarifications to be necessary. See EXPLANATORY MEMO, supra note 
20, § I(A)(5). 
In the framework of the European Economic Communities, two bodies directly participate in 
the process of enacting community wide legislation: the Commission and the Council of 
Ministers. EUROPEAN COMMUNITY: THE FACTS, EUROPEAN COMMUNITY INFORMATION SERVICE 
(1974) reprinted in F. KIRGIS, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS IN THEIR LEGAL SETTING 608-09 
(1977) [hereinafter' cited as EC: Facts]. Two other Community institutions, the European Parlia-
ment and the Economic and Social Committee, id. at 610, are playing important roles in the 
process of the "Multinational Directive." MULTINATIONAL DIRECTIVE, COM (80) 423 final, 
Preamble; see EXPLANATORY MEMO, supra note 20, § I(A)(5) (foreseeing consultations with these 
two EEC bodies before final enactment of the Directive). 
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This Comment begins with a discussion of the status of MNEs in the world 
economic and legal order. In addition, the author describes the balance of 
power relationship between labor and the MNE, considering their differing 
points of view. The substantive provisions of the proposed Multinational 
Directive - information disclosure and consultation - is discussed in relation 
to this balance of power. 
The author examines the' 'runaway plant" 26 problem as a basis for prac-
tical application of the proposal's requirements. The requirements are par-
The Commission, composed of representatives of each of the member States (two each from 
France, Italy, Germany and the United Kingdom and one each from Luxembourg, the Nether-
lands, Belgium, Denmark and Ireland) is responsible for proposing community policy. EC: 
FACTS, supra, at 608-09. It has the power and authority to propose legislative programs and texts 
for adoption by the Council. EEC Treaty, supra note 15, art. 155. It does not have the power to 
compel any further actions on its proposals. The Commission may also consult with experts from 
national governments and trade, management, agricultural and labor interest groups. EC: 
FACTS, supra, at 609. These experts will advise the Commission on the practical implications of 
the policy and also the acceptability of the Commission's proposals to the governments of the 
member states. With the assistance of its own specialist departments, the Commission considers 
the proposals until it reaches its final position which is then submitted to the Council. Lasok & 
Bridge, An Introduction to the Law and Institutions of the European Communities, 104-08 (1973), reprinted 
in F. KIRGIS, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS IN THEIR LEGAL SETTING 613,614 (1977). 
The Council of Ministers is the body with the power to make decisions. EEC Treaty, supra note 
15, art. 145. It has the power to vote on proposals submitted by the Commission. EC: FACTS, 
supra, at 609. Under this power the Council may issue directives, which are binding as to the 
result to be achieved. EEC Treaty, supra, note 15, art. 189. To the Member States is left the 
choice of exact form and method of execution. Id. The Directive, addressed to the Member 
States, Multinational Directive, COM (80) 423 final, art. 19, requires each state to introduce 
laws, regulations and administrative provisions necessary to comply with the Directive. Id. art. 
17(1). Although directives are addressed to the States, the European Court of Justice, EEC 
Treaty, supra, note 15, arts. 164-88, 192, (establishing the European Court of Justice as the 
highest court of the European Communities) has held that individual rights and obligations are 
created by the binding nature of the directive in conjunction with Article 177 which allows in-
dividuals to invoke acts of the Community in national courts. See Van Duyn v. Home Office, Case 
No. 41174 [1974] E. Comm. Ct.J. Rep. 1337, 1347-48, asexcerptedinJ. KIRGIS, INTERNATIONAL 
ORGANIZATIONS IN THEIR LEGAL SETTING, 650-51 (1977). Through a system of weighted voting, 
the Council then may enact the Directive. EEC Treaty, supra, note 15, art. 148. 
The European Parliament is consulted for its opinion on laws under consideration. EC: FACTS, 
supra, at 610. This consultation allows political and social considerations to be heard in the Parlia-
ment. The entire gamut of nationalities, social interests and political convictions that exist in the 
EEC is represented in the Parliament. REPORT OF THE WORKING PARTY EXAMINING THE PROB-
LEM OF THE ENLARGEMENT OF THE POWERS OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT (REPORT VEDEL). 
[1972] BULL. EUR. COMM. (Supp. 4172) 32 (1972). The Economic and Social Committee serves a 
similar function. EC: FACTS, supra, at 610; see EEC Treaty, supra, note 15, art. 193. 
For a more in depth discussion of European Community law and the legislative process, see 
generally, Schwartz, Article 235 and Law-making Powers in the European Community, 27 INT'L& COMPo 
L.Q. 614 (1978); Steiner, The Application of European Community Law in National Courts - Problems, 
Pitfalls and Precepts, 96 LAW Q. REV. 126 (1980); A. ROBERTSON, EUROPEAN INSTITUTIONS: 
COOPERATION, INTERGRATION, UNIFICATION 160-205 (2d ed. 1966). 
26. "Runaway Plant" describes the situation where the company either transfers or threatens 
to transfer its operations as a bargaining tactic. See Lockouts, Shutdowns, Runaway Shops, [1972] 3 
LAB. L. REP. (CCH) , 4090. For example, when an employer, faced with either a union first 
organizing or a union making what the employer perceives to be a costly demand, threatens to 
close the plant and move elsewhere unless his position is accepted by the workers, his conduct 
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ticularly important in the runaway plant context because this tactic tends to 
create an imbalance in the normal bargaining positions of labor and manage-
ment. Both labor and MNEs will benefit from a framework that requires 
closer contacts between labor and the management of MNEs. In theory, the 
proposed measure will provide security for labor while simultaneously creat-
ing a context of understanding of management decisions in the dynamic inter-
national economic arena. Finally, the author concludes that the proposed 
European Legislation if finally enacted will contribute to stability in industrial 
relations. 
II. THE MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISE 
Generally, a multinational enterprise27 is a business undertaking which 
engages in economically significant activities within two or more countries but 
which guides and influences those activities from a single decision-making 
center. 28 A MNE is a major institution of the modern, world economic 
order.29 While oil and food companies have operated in the multinational 
form since the beginning of this century, 30 the scale and sophistication of 
MNE operations have significantly increased since World War 11.31 Estimates 
published in 1980 by the Independent Commission on International Develop-
ment Issues under the chairmanship of Willy Brandt concluded that MNEs 
now control between a quarter and a third of all world production. 32 In addi-
tion, MNEs are currently responsible for over half of world trade. 33 The im-
portance of MNEs lies not in mere size or extendedness34 but i'n the influence 
comes within the parameters of the runaway plant problem. See Note, Runaway Shop - A Perennial 
Threat to Organized Labor, 37 NOTRE DAME LAW. 357, 358-59 (1962) [hereinafter cited as Runaway 
Shop]. 
27. The definition of a MNE will be more fully discussed in § V.B infra. The definition here, 
though a loose one, is a sufficient working definition for the purpose of a discussion on the prob-
lems with MNEs. 
28. Galbraith, supra note 1, at 84, 86. 
29. Cox, supra note 10, at 344; see generally Barnett, The World's Resources - Human Energy, 56 
NEW YORKER 46 (Apr. 7, 1980) [hereinafter cited as Barnett]. Global resources are being man-
aged by multinational corporations. The integration of huge operations developing and process-
ing resources is within the expertise of these multinationals. The ability ofMNEs to acquire such 
size and efficiency has been brought about by the development of two new technologies: (1) the 
technology for conquering distance (communications and transportation); and (2) the technology 
for fragmenting the production process into component operations which can be performed at dif-
ferent locations and integrated into a final product (standardized production engineering and 
management). /d. at 46-50. 
30. NORTH-SOUTH, supra note 10, at 187. See generally Cox, supra note 10, at 345-46. 
31. NORTH-SOUTH, supra note 10, at 187. See also Comment, Regulation of the Labor Relations of 
Multinational Enterprises: A Comparative Analysis and a Proposal for NLRA Reform, 2 B.C. INT'L COMP. 
L. REV. 371 (1978). 
32. NORTH-SOUTH, supra note 10, at 187. 
33. See Baade, supra note 7, at 409. See also Fayerweather, The Internationalization of Business, 403 
ANNALS 1, 2-3 (Sept. 1972) (tracing the transition of MNEs into significant economic institu-
tions). 
34. Cj, Vagts, supra note 6, at 747-51. Size does not necessarily lead to high profitability. 
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and power a MNE wields in its markets. 35 MNEs have grown in both in-
fluence and power by directly participating in the production, distribution and 
service sectors of various economies. 36 This position is likely to enable MNEs 
to playa major role in the future of world trade and international direct invest-
ment. 37 
The rapid development of MNEs has generated a great deal of public con-
cern. 38 Complaints cover a considerable range of subjects in both labor and 
non-labor areas. In general, MNEs have been charged with: failing to adjust 
to the legislation of host countries in specific matters such as investment and 
labor policies;39 failing to respect the socio-cultural identities of host 
countries;40 and contributing to the support of socially undesirable policies 
such as apartheidY In the area oflabor, concern focuses on the concentration 
of economic power and on conflicts with laborY Such complaints became the 
foundation of public discussion concerning MNEs.43 
III. INTERNATIONAL CODES OF CONDUCT 
As the 1970's began, "statutory and case law reaction [to the MNE prob-
lem was 1 virtually nonexistent. "44 At the same time that the legal literature 
began to consider the challenge of MNEs,45 the International Court of Justice 
discussed the lack of international authority on the subject: 
Considering the important developments of the last half-century, 
the growth of foreign investments and the expansion of the inter-
national activities of corporations, in particular of holding com-
Sometimes profit expectations are disappointed. MNEs depend on the possession of technical in-
novation and must keep pace with new developments in order to maintain profits. /d. 
35. See Galbraith, supra note 1, at 83, 84, 86. 
36. See Baade, supra note 7, at 409. 
37. See U. N. COMMISSION ON TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS, TRANSNATIONAL CORPORA-
TIONS IN'WORLD DEVELOPMENT: A RE-EXAMINATION, U.N. Doc. E/C. 10/38, Mar. 20, 1978. 
See generally, Barnett, supra note 29. 
38. Baade, supra note 7, at 409. See, e.g., U.N. REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON TRANSNA-
TIONALCORPORATIONS, ECOSOC Off. Rec. 61st Sess. Supp. No.5 (May, 1976); 15 INT'LLEG. 
MAT. 779, 798-99 (1977) [hereinafter cited as U.N. REPORT], Annex I and II (listing areas of 
concern on the operations and activities of transnational corporations and governments). 
39. U.N. REPORT, supra note 38, at 798 (Annex I, S 2). 
40. [d. at 799, S 21. 
41. /d. at 798, S to. Additional areas of concern include: lack of adjustment to locallegisla-
tion, refusal of MNEs to accept exclusive jurisdiction of domestic law, direct or indirect interfer-
ence in internal affairs of the host country, role of MNEs in illegal traffic of arms, tendency not to 
conform to national development policies, failure to adapt imported technology to local condi-
tions, and imposition of restrictive business practices on subsidiaries. [d. at 798-99. 
42. See!LO Tripartite Declaration, supra note 4, art. 1. 
43. See Baade, supra note 7, at 408-14. 
44. Vagts, supra note 6, at 739. 
45. See Baade, supra note 7, at 411. MNEs have been identified as a serious challenge for inter-
national law . See Vagts, supra note 6. 
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panies, which are often multinational, and considering the way in 
which the economic interests of states have proliferated, it may at 
first sight appear surprising that the evolution of law has not gone 
further and that no generally accepted rules in the matter have 
crystallized on the international plane. 46 
415 
In the 1970's, several major international organizations47 became engaged 
in activities concerning the multinational enterprise. 48 In attempting to im-
pose rules on MNEs governing the conduct of business activities, internation-
al organizations appear to favor the use of codes of conduct. 49 The trend has 
been to consider detailed proposals for codes of conduct and to formulate such 
codes for MNEs. so Codes of conduct currently in effect under the authority of 
the International Labor Organization (ILO)SI and the Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)S2 are examples of this pat-
46. Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Ltd. (Belgium v. Spain), [1970)I.C.j. 3, 46-47. 
47. See Baade, supra note 7, at 412. See supra note 3. 
Since the Barcelona Traction Case, [1970)I.C.J. at 3, both state practice and scholarly commen-
tary on MNEs has increased. But there is no reliably recorded or accessibly reported body of 
decisional law concerning MNEs. The scholarly discussion also far outstrips the supply of deci-
sionallaw. Baade, supra note 7, at 413. 
48. See generally Baade, supra note 7. Developing and Enforcing Guidelines for Multinational Enter-
prises, 1976 PROC. AM. SOC. INT'L L. 16, 16-34 (1976); see e.g., Programme of Action on the 
Establishment ofa New International Economic Order of May 1, 1974, Gen. Ass. Res. 3202, S-7 
GAOR, Supp. (No.1) 5 U.N. Doc. Al9559 (1974) reprinted in 13 INT'LLEG. MAT. 720 (1974); see 
e.g., OECD Guidelines, supra note 4; see e.g., ILO Tripartite Declaration, supra note 4; see e.g., 
Multinational Directive, COM (80) 423 final. 
49. See Baade, supra note 7, at 412. 
50. Id. 
51. The International Labor Organization is organized by Constitution as an international 
agency which is integrated with the United Nations. The work of the ILO consists of supervising 
labor conventions and recommendations. See Constitution of the International Labor Organiza-
tion (adopted by the ILO General Conference, Oct. 9, 1946) 62 Stat. 3485, T.I.A.S. No. 1868. 
The Tripartite setup of the ILO consists of representatives of workers, employers and govern-
ments.ld. 
52. The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) includes in its 
membership the major industrialized nations of Western Europe, North America, and the Far 
East plus one major developing country (Turkey). 75 DEP'T STATE BULL. 83-88 (1976). The 
OECD is an instrument for intergovernment cooperation on matters relevant to economic and 
social policy. Members include: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, 
France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, 
The Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the 
United Kingdom and the U.S. See generally, R. BLANPAIN, THE OECD GUIDELINES FOR MULTI-
NATIONAL ENTERPRISES AND LABOUR RELATIONS: 1976-1979, at 25 (1979) [hereinafter cited as 
BLANPAIN). 
The code of conduct movement is part of a global attempt to reach and implement a consensus 
on mechanisms of economic cooperation in practical terms. N. Horn, Codes of Conduct for MNEs 
and Transnational Lex Mercatoria: An International Process of Learning and Law Making, in LEGAL PROB-
LEMS OF CODES OF CONDUCT FOR MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES 45, 49 (N. Horn ed. 1980). 
Codes provide lists and definitions of issues of concern. They analyze the roles of the various 
parties (MNEs, government and labor) involved. And they focus attention on areas of conflict. 
Id. at 47. 
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tern. These codes, which are similar in language, 53 present guidelines to 
MNEs on the conduct of business activities. 54 The guidelines are designed to 
protect the economies, workers, consumers, competitors and creditors in host 
countries from unilateral action emanating from MNE headquarters. 55 The 
EEC is structuring a similar regulatory code. 56 
The governmental structure of the EEC is authorized to harmonize Euro-
pean law. 57 A legislative measure has been introduced within that structure by 
the EEC Commission58 which would place binding regulations on MNE ac-
tivities in the EEC. 59 Initially, this measure took the form of a directive which 
would require member nations of the EEC to give statutory effect to certain 
regulations governing information disclosure and consultation. 60 The Com-
mission approved the text of the directive on October 1, 1980, and also recom-
mended that the directive be approved by the European Council. 61 
The legal basis for this directive is Article 100 of the EEC Treaty. 62 Article 
100 empowers the Council63 to issue directives to harmonize national laws and 
regulations. 64 This process for harmonization is considered appropriate for 
disclosure and consultation requirements because: 
53. See Baade, supra note 7, at 421. Compare OECD Guidelines, supra note 4 with fLO Tripartite 
Declaration, supra note 4. 
54. H. Baade, The Legal Effects of Codes of Conduct for Multinational Enterprises, in LEGAL PROB-
LEMS OF CODES OF CONDUCT FOR MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES 3,7-8 (N. Horn ed. 1980) [here-
inafter cited as Baade, Effects of Codes). 
55. /d. at 13. 
Notwithstanding the current efforts to bring more controls and regulations to the activities of 
multinational enterprises, lawmakers and commentators recognize MNEs as playing an impor-
tant role in the world development. fd. The common stated aim of OECD countries is to en-
courage the positive contributions which multinational enterprises can make to economic and 
social progress and to minimize and resolve the difficulties to which their various operations may 
give rise. OECD Guidelines, supra note 4, Introduction, para. 2. "[Such) enterprises can bring 
substantial benefits to home and host countries by contributing to the efficient utilization of 
capital, technology and human resources between countries and can thus fulfill an important role 
in the promotion of economic and social welfare." /d., para. 1. 
In its Declaration of Principles, the International Labor Organization also recognized that 
MNEs can make important contributions to the improvement ofliving standards, the satisfaction 
of basic needs and the creation of employment opportunities. fLO Tripartite Declaration, supra note 
4, art. 1. 
56. Multinational Directive, COM (80) 423 final; see § V.A irifra. Work is also currently taking 
place in the United Nations, on development of a regulatory code in the Centre on Transnational 
Corporations. See generally, 1 C.T.C. RPTR. No.6, at 1 (Apr. 1979). 
57. See EEC Treaty, supra note 15, art. 100. 
58. See note 25 supra. 
59. Multinational Directive, COM (80) 423 final. 
60. fd. art. 17. 
61. Background Document, EEC fndu,trial Relations: Text of Worker and Consultation Proposals, 
718 EUROPEAN REPORT (press release of the European Communities) (Oct. I, 1980). 
62. Multinational Directive, COM (80) 423 final, Preamble. See also EXPLANATORY MEMO, 
supra note 20, § I(B). 
63. See note 25 supra. 
64. EEC Treaty, supra note 15, art. 100. 
, 
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The lack of consistency between information and consultation pro-
cedures on one hand and the complex structure of undertakings on 
the other has a direct effect on the operation of the common 
market and should therefore be remedied by approximating 
legislation while maintaining progress within the meaning of Arti-
cle 117 of the Treaty. 65 
417 
In the report issued with the proposed Multinational Directive,66 the Com-
mission stated that the Multinational Directive was modeled after the relevant 
provisions of the OECD Guidelines67 and the ILO Tripartite Declaration. 68 
The EEC Commission has announced its intention to follow the objectives of 
the OECD and ILO documents69 and to participate in the proceedings ofthese 
organizations in the field of MNE regulation. 70 
The Multinational Directive will not immediately become law in the EEC 
for several reasons: 71 the directive is controversial; labor and business groups 
have diametrically opposing views on the subject;72 and although the Commis-
sion approved the directive in October 1980,73 it must endure a lengthy gesta-
tion period before it becomes effective. 74 
The EEC Commission sent the proposal to the European Parliament75 for 
debate in October 1980. 76 The members of the Commission expect that the 
discussion in the Parliament will lead to further developments in the language 
of the proposed directive. 77 The directive is viewed as essentially political in 
65. EXPLANATORY MEMO, supra note 20, § I(B); EEC Treaty, supra note 15, art. 117. Article 
117 states: 
Member States agree upon the need to promote improved working conditions and an 
improved standard of living for workers, so as to make possible their harmonization 
while the improvement is being maintained. 
They believe that such a development will ensue not only from the functioning of the 
common market, which will favor the harmonization of social systems, but also from 
the procedures provided for in this Treaty and from the approximation of provisions 
laid down by law, regulation and administrative action. 
66. "The same objectives as those enshrined in international instruments that are not legally 
binding, such as the OECD guidelines and the ILO Tripartite Declaration, will be followed with 
regard to the activities of transnational firms ... " EXPLANATORY MEMO, supra note 20, § 
I(A)(4). See Worker Consultation: Mr. Vredling Outlines Scope and Aims, 2991 EUROPE 5 (Oct. 
2, 1980), reporting Vice-President Henk Vredling as saying that the directive was partially based 
on the OECD and ILO "codes of conduct" [hereinafter cited as Vredling Outlines Scope]. 
67. OECD Guidelines, supra note 4, Chapter on Employment and Industrial Relations. 
68. [LO Tripartite Declaration, supra note 4, arts. 24-28, 40-57. 
69. EXPLANATORY MEMO, supra note 20, Introduction § I(A)(4). 
70. Id. § I(A)(5). 
71. See Internal Market, Worker Consultation: Commission Proposes Directive to Council, 716 Euro-
pean Report 2 (Oct. 2, 1980) (press release of the European Communities) [hereinafter cited as 
Commission Proposes Directive]. 
72. [d. 
73. Id. 
74. See Merritt, Commission Adopts Disclosure Directive, Financial Times, Oct. 3, 1980, at 2. 
75. See note 25 supra. 
76. See ETUC Evaluation, supra note 18, § 4.1. 
77. Commission Proposes Directive, supra note 71, at 2. 
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nature; consequently, discussions within the Parliament, the political body of 
the EEC, will have an important bearing on the final version of the directive. 78 
In addition, the Commission sent the directive to the Economic and Social 
Committee79 of the EEC for review. 80 During this process, the directive may 
be altered. 81 The Commission will clarify or, if necessary, improve the present 
draft based on authorized opinions received from Parliament, the Economic 
and Social Committee or either of the labor and business organizations of the 
EEC before the Council enacts the directive. 82 
IV. MNEs AND LABOR 
A. Management oj the MNE 
With respect to labor relations, the nature of MNEs presents difficulties. 
Management of a multinational business enterprise is complex. 83 Manage-
ment of MNEs attempts to develop objectives for the corporation and for all of 
its subparts through corporate planning, which will work for the benefit of the 
whole. 84 Management of MNEs plans alternative courses of action after evalu-
ating external threats to the enterprise on the basis of the organization's 
strengths and weaknesses. 85 
However, business on an international level requires the enterprise to 
operate effectively within nations having diverse economic conditions and 
value systems. 86 In employing individuals from several nations, a MNE must 
have a labor policy which is flexible enough to encompass this diversityY 
Policies of recruitment, training, compensation and management must fit the 
needs of the MNE. 88 
Although communication and transportation advancements have greatly 
improved the managerial capabilities of MNEs,89 distance is still a factor in a 
MNE's ability to manage local operations from a central location. 90 Many 
companies give maximum autonomy to local management. 91 The primary 
78. /d. 
79. See note 25 supra. 
80. See ETUC Evaluation, supra note 18, § 4.1, at 6. 
81. Vredling Outlines Scope, supra note 66, at 5. 
82. /d. 
83. See J. SCHWENDIMAN, STRATEGIC AND LONG-RANGE PLANNING FOR THE MULTINATIONAL 
CORPORATION 7 (1973) [hereinafter cited as SCHWENDIMAN]. 
84. /d. 
85. /d. 
86. /d. at 5. 
87. R. HAYS, C. KORTH & M. ROUDIANI, INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS: AN INTRODUCTION TO 
THE WORLD OF THE MULTINATIONAL FIRM 295 (1972). 
88. /d. 
89. See Barnett, supra note 29, at 50. 
90. See SCHWENDIMAN, supra note 83, at 5. 
91. Barran, Comment on the Chapter by Mr. Lea: A Businessman's Viewpoint in THE MULTINA· 
TIONAL ENTERPRISE 164, 165 a. Dunning ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as Barran]. 
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role of central management is to achieve optimum results for the entire enter-
prise through coordination and planning. 92 Under this system, local opera-
tions attempt to maximize their profit results93 while central manag~ment 
reconciles local decisions and allocates resources throughout the enterprise. 94 
MNE central management also must consider that legal obligations are imposed 
on local management by national laws of the country in which the local com-
pany operates or is incorporated. 95 These laws generally hold the managers of 
the local entity responsible for all decisions concerning that entity. 96 This 
system places the responsibility for information disclosure and consultation on 
local management which must handle this duty in accordance with local 
laws. 97 As a result, there is a tendency for negotiations in the context of in-
dustrial relations to be conducted at the local level. 98 
Although a vast accumulation of knowledge and experience is available at 
MNE headquarters,99 variations in local conditions are best known to local 
management. 100 Local managers are in the best position to reach settlements 
which contribute to the productivity of the entitylOl because they can evaluate 
the needs of particular situations. l02 Central management, on the other hand, 
must take into account the variety of the MNE's activities and the differences 
in national legal systems in order to formulate policy.l03 Thus, central 
management of a MNE involves solving the problem of organizationl04 in 
order to meet the economic need for goods, services and raw materials. l05 
In management's view, the purpose of codes of conduct is both to improve 
the investment climate and to maximize the contributions which MNEs make 
to the economic arena. 106 Management maintains that the codes of conduct 
should not create obstacles to investment by imposing unnecessary controls. 107 
This perspective calls for flexibility in the interpretation of codes of conductl08 
92. Id. 
93. See Vagts, supra note 6, at 755-56. 
94. Barran, supra note 91, at 165. 
95. UNION DES INDUSTRIES DE LA COMMUNAUTE EUROPEENE, PROPOSAL FOR A DIRECTIVE ON 
EMPLOYEE INFORMATION AND CONSULTATION PROCEDURES IN ENTERPRISES WITH A COMPLEX 
STRUCTURE, AND IN PARTICULAR, TRANSNATIONAL ENTERPRISES: UNICE POSITION, para. 11 
(Feb. 19, 1981) (position paper of UNICE) [hereinafter cited as UNICE POSITION]. 
96. /d. 
97. Id. para. 13. 
98. Barran, supra note 91, at 166. 
99. /d. at 165-66. 
100. /d. at 166. 
101. /d. 
102. Id.; see UNICE POSITION, supra note 95, at para. 14. 
103. See Guertin, supra note 6, at 299. 
104. See Clausen, The Internationalized Corporation: An Executive's View, 403 ANNALS 12, 15 (Sept. 
1972). 
105. Guertin, supra note 6, at 298. 
106. /d. at 296. 
107. Id. at 297. 
108. /d. at 298. 
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SO that investment considerations may be weighed along with employment 
considerations. 109 Flexibility is necessary, in any case, in order to formulate 
enterprise policy which is responsive to variations, from state to state, in labor 
relations and in employment practices. 110 
B. The Concerns of Labor 
As a whole, the world labor force shares a general concern that MNEs are 
changing the world employment structurell1 while they are altering the inter-
national distribution of economic activities. 112 Trade unions view MNEs as 
holding a much stronger position than labor in the context of industrial rela-
tions by virtue of their size, resources and multinational character. 113 The 
popular impression is that a MNE is a formidable, effective and swift 
machine. 114 By operating in more than one jurisdiction, a MNE can minimize 
or avoid some of the controls, checks and balances115 that have evolved in the 
different countries in which it does business.116 Unions fear that because the 
management of a MNE is able to conceal the actual site of a particular deci-
sion, effective control or influence of those decisions is virtually impossible. 117 
1. Perceived Advantages of MNEs over Labor Organizations 
In general, trade unions believe that their bargaining power is reduced be-
cause of the remoteness of the MNE central management and the disparity in 
109. /d. at 300. 
110. See id. at 298; BLANPAIN, supra note 52, at 263; UNICE POSITION, supra note 95, para. 3. 
111. Cox, supra note 10, at 347. The particular concerns of the industrial and the underdevel-
oped nations are different from each other. See generally id., at 345-51. The underdeveloped na-
tions are concerned with exploitation of cheap labor in their countries with no real long-term 
benefits to the work force. For a discussion of the problems of the underdeveloped nations, see 
generally, NORTH-SOUTH, supra note 10. Industrialization in Third World countries has destroyed 
jobs in the rural areas without creating equivalent long-term jobs in the factory centers. Barnett, 
supra note 29, at 70. On the other hand, in the industrialized nations, unions are concerned with 
job security and the loss of bargaining power due to the remoteness of the central management of 
MNEs. See Blake, Trade Unions and the Challenge of the Multinational Corporation, 403 ANNALS 34,37 
(Sept. 1972) [hereinafter cited as Blake]; Murphy, supra note 11, at 626; Baade, supra note 7, at 
415. 
112. Cox, supra note 10, at 345. 
113. See Blake, supra note 111, at 36-37. Professor Vagts attributes the strength of the MNE to 
the following factors: 
(1) the MNE has a structure and orientation which allow it to develop a strategy that is 
more nearly global in viewpoint than that of any previous business entity - this is, one 
which pays less heed to national frontiers in pursuit of its objectives; (2) the MNE's em-
phasis on technology makes it both a formidable competitor or antagonist and a highly 
desirable guest; and (3) the MNE is a large scale enterprise with many readily available 
resources and frequently a commanding market position. 
Vagts, supra note 6, at 756. 
114. Vagts, supra note 6, at 756 
115. Cox, supra note 10, at 353. 
116. /d. For a treatment of national laws, see generally P. MEINHARDT, COMPANY LAW IN 
EUROPE (1975) [hereinafter cited as MEINHARDT]. 
117. See Blake, supra note 111, at 36. 
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their respective abilities to gather information. liB A MNE has the advantage 
of a sophisticated and centralized information and decision-making system. 119 
On the other hand, trade unions usually lack complete information concern-
ing factors which affect employee interests. 120 The nature of this difference 
places trade unions in a disadvantageous position. 121 Where the real decision-
making authority of a MNE is outside the host country, labor is unable to ex-
ert much influence because of vast differences in the organized strength of 
unions in different countries. 122 Unions find it difficult to organize any unified 
action against a MNE.123 While labor may be well-organized and may have a 
strong bargaining position in one country, differences in ideologies, politics 
and interests make transnational union cooperation difficult to accomplish. 124 
Furthermore, labor organization is not as amenable to centralized control and 
decision-making as is a MNE because different interest groups within the 
union must be satisfied. 125 Therefore, effective unified action is only likely 
when the common interest is obvious and immediate. 126 
2. Effect on Use of Traditional Labor Weapons 
The size and diversity of MNEs provide them with a position of strength 
when dealing with labor unions in bargaining situations. 127 This strength 
enables MNEs to use such strategies as holding out until the union submits to 
management's position, shifting production or moving production complete-
ly.128 These strategies threaten worker security, especially where a MNE can 
take advantage of a global capability that is beyond the influence of national 
unions. 129 
118. Baade, supra note 7, at 415. 
119. See Cox, supra note 10, at 354. 
120. /d.; see Pursey, supra note 12, at 279-80. The types of information needed by labor repre-
sentatives include financial statements, structure, employment figures, statements of transfer-
pricing policies, and accounting principles. /d., at 284. 
121. See Cox, supra note 10, at 354. 
122. /d. at 353-54. 
123. See Blake, supra note Ill, at 39. See generally Samuel, Transnational Collective Bargaining: An 
Idea Whose Time Has Not Yet Come, 29 LAB. L.]. 619 (1978) rhereinafter cited as Samuel]. 
124. Cox, supra note 10, at 354. A discussion of the legal and social aspects of transnational 
bargaining is outside of the scope ofthis article. For a treatment thereof see generally Murphy, supra 
note 11; Blake, supra note 111, at 38. See also Leonard, Coordinated Bargaining with Multinational 
Firms by American Labor Unions, 25 LAB. L.]. 746 (1974). 
125. See Cox, supra note 10, at 354. Conflicts of interests between unions are probably the 
main obstacle to effective international union collaboration. Roberts & May, The Response oj 
Multinational Enterprises to International Trade Union Pressures, 12 BRIT. ]. INDUS. REL. 403, 416 
(1974) rhereinafter cited as Roberts & May1. 
126. Roberts & May, supra note 125, at 416. 
127. See Blake, supra note 111, at 36-37. 
128. /d. at 37. 
129. Id. See generally BUSINESS INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION, 201 CHECKLISTS: DECISION 
MAKING IN INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS 200-01 (1980). See also FIRST NATIONAL CITY BANK, 
MANAGERS GUIDE TO EMPLOYEE RELATIONS (United Kingdom), reprinted in R. BLANPAIN, THE 
OECD GUIDELINES FOR MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES AND LABOUR RELATIONS 1976-1979, at 
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One of the most important weapons that a union possesses with respect to 
bargaining with management is the strike. 13O However, a MNE can hold out 
better in a strike because profit centers are geographically diversified. 131 
MNEs can minimize disruptions by shifting operations among various centers 
in order to maintain delivery of products and services to the markets affected 
by any given industrial dispute. 132 A MNE can evade labor disputes by 
permanently closing operations in areas where labor conditions are adverse. 133 
The nature of MNEs gives local union officials the sense that enterprise deci-
sions are made on the basis of international considerations with little attention 
given to local needs. 134 These factors undermine the effectiveness of the strike 
as a weapon by reducing the confidence of local members that their efforts will 
influence decisions. 135 Because the relative positions of workers and employers 
determine wage structures,136 the reduction of relative union strength is viewed 
by labor leaders as critical. 137 
C. The MNE View of Industrial Relations 
From the perspective of MNE supporters, analysis of the foregoing 
strategies is quite different. Adversaries of the MNE maintain that due to its 
international orientation a MNE can hold out in a strike longer than a local 
enterprise. 138 However, MNE supporters argue that the supposed advantage 
of diverse profit centers presumes a singleness of purpose that is not presently 
a reality. 139 This latter position views a MNE as a coalition of persons with 
separate goals and differing capacities to influence corporate policy rather 
than as a unified body of decision-makers.14° Persons in charge of specific divi-
175 (1979). This guide demonstrates a generally negative attitude towards unions calling for tac-
tics designed to prevent union organization. /d. at 179. 
130. Kujawa, U.S. Labor, Multinational Enterprises and the Nationallnterest: A Proposalfor Labor 
Law Reform, 10 LAW & POL'y INT'L Bus. 941, 946 (1978). See also, Comment, National Labor 
Unions v. Multinational Companies: The Dilemma of Unequal Bargaining Power, 11 COLUM. J. 
TRANSNAT'L L. 124 (1972) [hereinafter cited as NLUs v. MNCs]. 
131. Blake, supra note 111, at 36-37. 
132. /d. at 37. 
133. See NLUs v. MNCs, supra note 130, at 125. 
134. See Blake, supra note 111, at 36-37. See also Pursey, supra note 12, at 280. 
135. See Vagts, supra note 6, at 774. In the event of complete transfer of production, MNEs can 
undermine even' government job security. See id. It may be particularly hard for local govern-
ments to enforce their laws on severance payor other benefits to be given to severed employees. 
ld. If a MNE fails to comply, enforcement of such requirements could be difficult or impossible, 
even though some company assets might be left behind. /d. 
136. Van Langendonck, supra note 19, at 88. 
137. See Cox, supra note 10, at 353. 
138. See Blake, supra note 111, at 37. 
139. See Vagts, supra note 6, at 755 . 
.140. /d. 
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sions tend to emphasize the importance of their own operations instead of 
sacrificing them for the benefit of the larger enterprise. 141 
While minimizing the effects oflabor disruptions by shifting production and 
by importing items in order to maintain sales in the local market is possible, 
management sees this as an unacceptable tactic.142 Use of this tactic for short 
term advantage could lead to the singling out of the particular MNE by other 
labor unions and governments who could create economic and legal hardships 
for the enterprise. 143 Also, while a MNE generally has the capacity to transfer 
operations to counter a strike, the benefits of such a strategy are often 
illusory.144 The cost of transferring an entire operation is high. 145 Therefore, 
the use of such a transfer to obtain leverage over labor is impractical and 
unrealistic. 146 Therefore, most MNE proponents argue that controls other 
than those already in place are unnecessary. 147 
D. Organized Labor's Attempt to Reconcile Its Perceived 
Disadvantaged Position 
The existence of the Multinational Directive is due, in large part, to the ef-
forts of organized labor in Europe.148 Though MNEs, in general, are in the 
forefront of industry in labor relations, wages and working conditions,149 the 
exceptions l50 to this general trend have attracted the attention of the public. 151 
Before the Multinational Directive was formulated, 152 the International Labor 
Organization formally expressed the growing concerns of labor about the 
shortcomings of MNEs: 
The advances made by multinational enterprises in orgamzmg 
their operations beyond the national framework may lead to abuse 
141. !d. 
142. See Gould, Multinational Corporations and Multinational Unions: Myths, Reality and the Law, 10 
INT'L LAW. 655, 659 (1976). Employers are circumscribed in their ability to respond across na-
tional borders because of increased costs of transportation and products, and the lack of product 
uniformity in many industries. !d. at 659-61. 
143. See Shearer, Fact and Fiction Concerning Multinational Labor Relations, 10 VAND. J. 
TRANSNAT'L L. 51, 55-56 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Shearer]. 
144. Id. 
145. !d. at 55. 
146. See id. 
147. See Business Brief, UNICE: Opposition to Draft Directive on Multinational Employees, 695 
European Report (press release of the European Communities) 5 Gune 19, 1980) [hereinafter 
cited as UNICE: Opposition]. 
148. See ETUC Evaluation, supra note 18, § 1.1 (strong opposition was presented to the Direc-
ti~ by European representatives of capital). 
149. BLANPAIN, supra note 52, at 18. 
150. See generally id. at 123-24, for MNE cases brought before the Committee on International 
Investment and Multinational Enterprises of the OECD. 
151. !d. at 18. 
152. The ILO Tripartite Declaration was published November 16, 1977, whereas the Multi-
national Directive was published October 1, 1980. See note 4 supra. 
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of concentrations of economic power and to conflicts with national 
policy objectives and with the interests of the workers. In addition, 
the complexity of multinational enterprises and the difficulty of 
clearly perceiving their diverse structures, operations and policies 
sometimes give rise to concern either in the home or in the host 
countries, or in both. '53 
The frequency with which MNEs resort to objectionable tactics '54 is not 
wholly relevant. 155 Labor's perception of the labor relations tactics employed 
by MNEs is more important. Labor believes that tactics such as shifting or mov-
ing production can be utilized. However, this belief has weakened the 
bargaining position of labor by instilling fear in the rank and file membership 
that workers will lose their jobs if their representatives bargain too hard. '56 
In the absence of formal governmental controls on MNEs, trade unions 
have employed two counter strategies to restore a balance of power between 
themselves and MNEs: (1) international coordinated bargaining'57 and (2) 
political pressures on government organizations to adopt binding interna-
tional regulations on MNE conduct. 158 Under the first counter strategy, labor 
attempts to reinforce its collective bargaining position vis-a.-vis a MNE by sup-
porting union organizations in other nations. Thus, a network of cooperation 
may be developed between unions dealing with the same MNE.159 In effecting 
this coordination, unions have drawn on their experiences in organizing 
solidarity actions within the same trade or industry. !60 However, the diversity 
of goals and philosophies among unions!61 has made the value of this tactic 
153. [LO Tripartite Declaration, supra note 4, art. 1. 
154. See § IV.B supra. 
155. See Address by George Ball, Columbia Law School (Feb. 26, 1976) reprinted in Conference 
on the Regulation of Transnational Corporation, The Friedma·n Series in Int'l Law, Columbia 
Law School 44,49 (1976) (available in Harvard Law School Int'l Legal Studies Library). 
156. !d. See also INTERNATIONAL CONFEDERATION OF FREE TRADE UNIONS, TRADE UNIONS 
AND THE TRANSNATIONALS: A HANDBOOK FOR NEGOTIATORS, 32 (IFCTU Twelfth World Con-
gress, 1979) [hereinafter cited as HANDBOOK FOR NEGOTIATORS]. 
157. See Blake, supra note 111, at 40; see BLANPAIN, supra note 52, at 18-20. But see Samuel supra 
note 123, at 619 (arguing that transnational collective bargaining is not widespread). 
158. See Workers' Right of Participation in Multinational Companies, Resolution adopted by 
the Executive Committee of the European Trade Union Confederation of February 6, 1975, 
reprinted in 23 I.C.F.T.U. ECON. & Soc. BULL. 15 Gan.-Mar., 1975). See e.g., ICFTU, CHARTER 
OF TRADE UNION DEMANDS FOR THE LEGISLATIVE CONTROL OF MULTINATIONAL COMPANIES, 
Oct. 1975, ICFTU Doc. D/1976/0403/13, at 17 (calling-for regulations governing recognition of 
trade unions and collective bargaining, information, access to headquarters and real decision 
makers, consultation on investment decisions, countering of runaway firms and a legally binding 
code). 
159. Cox, supra note 10, at 353-54. See also Murphy! upra note 11, at 626-27. Unions in differ-
ent countries could exhange information on working conditions, wages, benefits, contract provi-
sions, production and profit figures, and the nature of management actions. They could also con-
sult with each other on the planning and implementation of joint actions. Blake, supra note 111, at 
40-4l. 
160. ICFTU, THE MULTINATIONAL CHALLENGE, ICFTU Doc. D/197110403/64, at 24 
[hereinafter cited as MULTINATIONAL CHALLENGE]. 
161. See § IV.B.2 supra. See also Cox, supra note 10, at 354. 
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minimal when used against strong MNE coordinated management 
planning. 162 
Under the second counter strategy, trade unions pressure governments for 
MNE controls which would benefit the interests oflabor. 163 In the countries of 
the EEC where union membership is broad-based, 164 the relationship between 
unions and political parties is important. 165 This political influence is also ex-
ercised with respect to international organizations. 166 
The unions' intention under the second strategy is to work for effective 
public regulation. 167 Basically, labor's position calls for legally binding codes of 
conduct for MNEs.168 Although several voluntary codes have been enacted,169 
labor's basic view is that continuing malpractice by MNEs will not cease until 
obligations with legal sanctions become effective .170 Among the regulations 
proposed by labor are two key elements which would result in more balanced 
bargaining between labor and MNEs: information disclosure and consulta-
tion.l7l Consistent with this strategy, organized labor is particularly interested 
in the work being conducted in the EEC. 172 
162. See MULTINATIONAL CHALLENGE, supra note 160, at 23. 
163. Cox, supra note 10, at 355. 
164. See id. at 356. 
165. BLANPAIN, supra note 52, at 20. 
166. For example, the European Trade Union Confederation made the EEC Commission ap-
proval of the Multinational Directive, an article of organized labor's faith in the EEC policy-
making process. Business/Union Polarization, supra note 23, at 4. 
167. Cox, supra note 10, at 359. 
168. Tapiola, The Review of the OEeD Guidelines: A Trade Union Evaluation, in LEGAL PROBLEMS 
OF CODES OF CONDUCT FOR MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES, 291 (N. Horn ecJ. 1980) [hereinafter 
cited as Tapiola]. 
169. See OECD Guidelines, supra note 4; fLO Tripartite Declaration, supra note 4. 
170. BLANPAIN: TUAC Statement, supra note 12, at 103. 
171. See Tapiola, supra note 168, at 291. 
Examples of incidents where information might have been helpful include: 1. An MNE with 
factories in France experienced losses due to a falloff in sales for its heavy construction equip-
ment. The company considered taking steps for obtaining financial backing. The company 
reduced production, resulting in dismissals of large numbers of employees. Unawareness of the 
material information behind these decisions, coupled with rumors about major changes caused 
job insecurity and uncertainty about the company's future. The.company refused requests for in-
formation about the latest state of accounts. Large-scale dismissals came without the unions be-
ing able to assess their justification or negotiate about the need for them. BLANPAIN, supra note 
52, at 200. 2. In the case of another MNE in the Federal Republic of Germany, the central 
management decided to close a subsidiary which resulted in the loss of300 jobs. The trade-unions 
did not find out about this decision until the matter had been definitely decided. Even the local 
management oposed the move. In spite of strong union arguments which would justify a decision 
to keep the plant open, the central management would not reconsider the decision. The union 
argued that the plant was a new facility and that the closure could not be justified on the grounds 
of inefficiency or lack of competitive power. Timely information disclosure might have enabled 
the union to affect the decision before it became final. !d. at 204-05. 3. In a MNE plant in 
Belgium, management continued to assert a bright outlook, even though the unions suspected 
difficulties because of the plant's. outdated technology. Without information, the unions were 
unable to present a rational solution and the result was a loss of over 300 jobs. fd. at 202-03. 
172. See ETUC Evaluation, supra note 18, § 3.1. 
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v. THE MULTINATIONAL DIP ECTIVE 
A. Background oj the Multinational Directive 
Early in 1972, the EEC officially recognized, due to the growth of MNEs as 
a major economic force, the need for policy formulation which would create a 
balance between: (1) the need of labor for employment security and (2) the 
need of the MNEs for business independence. 173 The Commission issued an 
official document entitled, "Multinational Undertakings Community 
Regulations. "174 This report stated that an imbalance between multinational 
enterprises and trade unions required the adoption oflegally binding rules. 175 
In particular, the report stated that such rules should provide for the preserva-
tion of working places. 176 The report rejected a voluntary code because of the 
Commission's belief that such a code would be effective only against those 
enterprises willing to comply. 177 
A resolution of the European Parliament approved the main features of the 
Commission's report, including the proposal for a commitment to a legislative 
program of binding rules.178 The Parliament agreed to the creation, in 
Europe, of a trade union counterweight to MNEs.179 In the EEC, binding 
rules necessary for such a counterweight can be instituted through the function 
of a directive. 180 The individual laws of all nations within the EEC are modeled 
after the text of the directive. 181 The result is that the EEC operates as a 
unit. 182 Thus, laws and regulations in one country could not be circumvented 
by MNEs going to another country within the Community. 183 
Several EEC countries have legislation that requires local enterprises to 
bargain with worker representatives, to supply information relevant to the 
bargaining process and to establish consultation procedures}8. However, 
173. [1972) Eur. ParI. Deb. 88-108 (Apr. 19, 1972) (Mr. Coppe at 89, 92) (German ed.) 
reprinted in Baade, supra note 7, at 407, 424. 
174. Multinational Undertakings and Community Regulations (Communication from the Commis-
sion to the Council, presented on Nov. 8, 1973), [1973) BULL. EUR. COMM., (Supp. 15173) 
(1973). 
175. !d. at 7, 9-12. 
176. [d. 
177. [d. at 8. 
178. Resolution of the European Parliament of December 12,1974,5 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. 
Cl) 37-39 (1975) (giving an opinion on the communication from the Commission to the Council 
on Multinational Undertakings). 
179. [d. § 11. 
180. See EEC Treaty, supra note 15, art. 189, which states that "[a) directive shall be binding 
as to the result to be achieved." 
181. Multinational Directive, COM (80) 423 final, art. 17; see EEC Treaty, supra note 15, art. 
189. 
182. See Baade, supra note 7, at 422. 
183. See D. BOWETI, THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL INS1ITUTlONS 178, 188 (3d ed. 1975). 
184. See generally MEINHARDT, supra note 116; Traub, Co-determination and tke New Austrian lAbor 
Code: A Multi-Channel System of Employee Participation, 14 INT'L LAW. 613 (1980) [hereinafter cited 
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these national laws are only applicable to local enterprises or local subsidiaries 
of MNEsl85 because their jurisdiction is limited by national boundaries. 186 In 
formulating the Multinational Directive, the European Commission recognized 
that as firms have become more complex and have expanded to the transna-
tionallevel, worker representatives have found that access to information with 
respect to local subsidiaries alone is of insignificant assistance when represent-
ing the interests of labor in collective bargaining. 187 The perception that 
separate national regulations are inadequate has resulted in the Commission's 
proposal for an international system of compulsory information disclosure and 
consultation requirements affecting MNEs.188 
The REC's Multinational Directivel89 aims to ensure that MNEs employ 
effective procedures to inform and consult with employees of transnational 
firms operating in the European Community.190 As proposed, the Directive 
contains three important and controversial provisions: 191 information dis-
closure; consultation with workers when a MNE is considering decisions hav-
ing substantial impact on jobs; and a clause for companies controlled from 
outside the EEC.192 
B. Defining the MNE within the Context oj Codes oj Conduct 
It is necessary to establish a working definition of MNE in the context of 
labor management relations in order to understand the purpose and applica-
tion of the Multinational Directive. 193 A suggested business definition of 
MNE194 is "[aJ cluster of corporations of diverse nationality joined together 
by ties of common ownership and responsive to a common management 
as Traub]; Vorbrugg, Labor Participation in German Companies and Its European Context, 11 INT'L 
LAW. 249 (1977) fhereinafter cited as Vorbrugg]. 
185. See EXPLANATORY MEMO, supra note 20, S I(A)(3). 
186. See Commission Proposes Directive, supra note 71, at 2; Morgenstern & Knapp, Multinational 
Enterprises and the Extraterritorial Applil;ation tif Labour Law, 27 INT'L & COMPo L.Q. 769, 786-87 
(1978) fhereinafter cited as Morgenstern & Knapp]. However, one way of getting labor law ap-
plied extraterritorially is by private international law where the parties in the contract expressly 
choose the specific law to govern the contract. /d. at 774-75. 
187. See EXPLANATORY MEMO, supra note 20, I(AXl)(2)(3) & (4). 
188. Id. 
189. COM (80) 423 final (Oct. 23, 1980). The proposal must still go through the EEC 
legislative process. See § III supra. 
190. COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, INFORMATION MEMO. P-86, at 1 (Oct. 
1980) fhereinafter cited as INFORMATION MEMO]. 
191. Business/Union Polarization, supra note 23, at 4. 
192. Multinational Directive, COM (80) 423 final, arts. 1, 5 & 6. 
193. See EXPLANATORY MEMO, supra note 20, S II(l) & (2). 
194. The term "multinational enterprise" is used interchangeably in most related literature 
with "transnational corporation" (the official U.N. term), enterprise, firm or company. 
Fatouro;, The U. N. Code tif Conduct on Transnational Corporations: A Critical Discussion of the First 
Drafting Phase, in LEGAL PROBLEMS OF CODES OF CONDUCT FOR MULTINATIONAL CORPORA· 
TlONS, 103 n.l (N. Horn ed. 1980). 
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strategy."195 This definition excludes firms holding shares for investment on-
ly, firms with only one subsidiary, intergovernmental ventures and other less 
complex structures. 196 Moreover, this definition does not address the relation-
ship between labor and MNEs.197 A more inclusive definition of a MNE 
would be a company, or cluster of legal entities,198 that "extends its business 
operations under one guiding direction to two or more countries. "199 The im-
portant characteristics are: (1) a central management in one country and (2) 
macro-economically significant business activities in another country. 200 This 
definition is useful because it contemplates the power relationship between 
unions and management. 201 Power is the essence of relations between labor 
and management. 202 Central decision-making alters the power relationship by 
isolating the decision-makers from any local display of power by employees. 203 
The macro-economic character of a MNE shifts power by providing more op-
tions to the decision-makers. 204 
Both the OECD Guidelines205 and the ILO Tripartite Declaration206 con-
sider the importance of central decision-making in their definitions of MNEs. 
Although each code states that a precise definition is not required to serve their 
purposes,207 the definitions of a MNE in both codes contain language in-
dicating the significance of central decision-making. 208 The OECD Guidelines 
state that a MNE is arranged so that one entity" [m lay be able to exercise a 
significant influence over the activities of the others." 209 The language in the 
ILO Tripartite Declaration refers to an enterprise that "[0 ]wns or controls 
. . facilities outside the country in which [it] is based." 210 The focus of these 
195. Vernon, Economic Sovereignty at Bay, 47 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 110, 114 (1968). 
196. Vagts, supra note 6, at 746. 
197. Compare, Vagts, supra note 6, at 745-46 (this definition is a business concept and does not 
suggest legal relationships) with BLANPAIN, supra note 52, at 17 (central decision making, affecting 
the balance between labor and management is at the heart of MNEs). 
198. Van Langendonck, supra note 19, at 88. 
199. Galbraith, supra note 1, at 83, 84. 
200. Baade, supra note 7, at 407, 408. 
201. See BLANPAIN, supra note 52, at 16-17; MULTINATIONAL CHALLENGE, supra note 160, at 
13-14, 19. 
202. See BLANPAIN, supra note 52, at 16-17; see R. BLANPAIN, THE BADGER CASE AND THE 
OECD GUIDELINES FOR MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES, 16-17 (1977) [hereinafter cited as THE 
BADGER CASEl. 
203. See BLANPAIN, supra note 52, at 17. 
204. [d. 
205. OECD Guidelines, supra note 4, Introduction, para. 8. 
206. [LO Tripartite Declaration, supra note 4, art. 6. 
207. [d.; OECD Guidelines, supra note 4, Introduction, para. 8. 
208. THE BADGER CASE, supra note 202, at 16; see BLANPAIN, supra note 52, at 16. 
209. OECD Guidelines, supra note 1, Introduction, para. 8. 
210. [LO Tripartite Declaration, supra note 4, art. 6. 
The ILO provision reads: 
Multinational enterprises include enterprises, whether they are of public, mixed or pri-
vate ownership, which own or control production, distribution, services or other facil-
ities outside the country in which they are based. The degree of autonomy of entities 
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two codes is significant when looking at the Multinational Directive because 
the EEC Commission refers to these codes as the starting points of the Direc-
tive in the explanatory memorandum which accompanied the draft text. 211 
The Directive is designed to facilitate the access to information by labor 
from all "undertakings" 212 which are dominant in relation to other subsid-
iaries213 or establishments. 214 Article 3 of the Directive defines an undertaking 
as "dominant," in relation to another undertaking, if it either: (1) holds the 
majority of votes relating to shares issued by another undertaking215 or (2) has 
the power to designate at least half the members of the administrative, 
management or supervisory bodies of another undertaking, where those 
members hold the majority of voting rights. 216 The Directive recognizes that 
the above control relationships result in inadequate information disclosure to 
labor on the local level. 217 Although the Directive reaches all undertakings , 218 it 
is particularly concerned with those undertakings which operate on a transna-
tional basis. 219 
C. Provisions Jor Reaching Both Community and 
Non-Community Based Undertakings 
The Multinational Directive provides that multinational enterprises must 
adhere to the requirements of the Directive220 regardless of whether their 
decision-making centers221 are located in member or non-member 
countries. 222 Article 9, paragraph 2 states that "[tJhe management of an 
within multinational enterprises in relation to each other varies widely from one such 
enterprise to another, depending on the nature of the links between such entities and 
their fields of activity and having regard to the great diversity in the form of ownership, 
in the size, in the nature and location of the operation of the enterprises concerned. 
fLO Tripartite Declaration, supra note 4, art. 6. 
211. EXPLANATORY MEMO, supra note 20, § I(A)(4), at 3. 
212. See Multinational Directive, COM (80) 423 final, art.!. 
213. /d. arts. 1,3. 
214. See id. art. 9(3). The preamble of the Directive expresses the importance of reaching all 
dominant undertakings: "Whereas in a common market where national economies are closely in-
terlinked, it is essential, if economic activities are to develop in a harmonious fashion, that [all] 
undertakings should be subject to the same obligations in relation to Community employees af-
fected by their decisions .... " 
215. fd. art. 3(2)(a). 
216. /d. art. 3(2)(b). 
217. See EXPLANATORY MEMO, supra note 20, S§ I(A)(I), (2) & (3); THE BADGER CASE, supra 
note 202, at 16-17; BLANPAIN, supra note 52, at 16-17. 
218. See EXPLANATORY MEMO, supra note 20, §§ I(A)(I) & (2). 
219. See Multinational Directive, COM (80) 423 final (The official title points out the applica-
tion to transnational undertakings); See EXPLANATORY MEMO, supra note 20, § I(A)(4). 
220. See EXPLANATORY MEMO, supra note 20, § II, art. 9. 
221. See Multinational Directive, COM (80) 423 final, art. 2(C). The decision making center 
is the place where the management of the undertaking actually performs its functions. /d. 
222. fd. art. 1. 
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undertaking whose decision-making center is located in a non-member coun-
try and which has at least one establishment in one member state shall be sub-
ject to the obligations [of] the Directive," 223 provided that the establishment 
employs at least 100 workers.224 
Where an undertaking does not have its decision-making center based in 
the EEe, the Multinational Directive supplies a means to ensure that the pro-
visions of the Directive are carried out. 225 Article 8 provides that if such an 
undertaking" [d]oes not ensure the presence within the community of at least 
one person able to fulfill the requirements as regards disclosure of information 
and consultation . . ., the management of the subsidiary that employs the 
largest number of employees within the community shall be responsible for 
fulfilling the [obligations]." 226 In addition, provisions of Articles 5, 6 and 8 re-
quire member states to establish and impose appropriate penalties against 
undertakings that fail to fulfill the requirements of the Directive. 227 
D. The Directive's Substantive Requirements: 
Information Disclosure and Consultation 
The EEe can impose substantive requirements on MNEs and can enforce 
compliance because it has territorial jurisdiction in all member states and com-
petence to create community-wide legislation. 228 In addition to creating a 
regulatory apparatus that can be utilized on an international level, the Multi-
national Directive establishes two requirements designed to balance the nego-
tiating power between labor and the multinational enterprise. 229 First, the 
Directive requires the management of each dominant undertaking to forward 
information concerning worker interests230 to its establishments231 or subsidi-
aries232 within the EEe so that these subsidiaries and establishments can com-
municate the information to their employee representatives. 233 The informa-
tion presents a complete picture of the activities and performance of the enter-
223. /d. art. 9(2). 
224. /d. art. 9(1). 
225. /d. art. 8. 
226. ld. 
227. See EXPLANATORY MEMO, supra note 20, § II, art. 6. 
228. Baade, supra note 7, at 422. 
229. Multinational Directive, COM (80) 423 final, art. 5 (requiring disclosure of information 
to workers), art. 6 (requiring consultation on decisions having substantial effect on worker in-
terests). 
230. EXPLANATORY MEMO, supra note 20, § II(4). See note 234, infra. 
231. Multinational Directive, COM (80) 423 final, art. 9. 
232. [d. art. 5(1). 
233. /d. art. 5(3). 
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prise in all of the countries in which it is established, m thus creating a con-
structive atmosphere of industrial relations by making the motives and opera-
tions of enterprises more visible. 235 
Second, the Directive requires management to consult with the representa-
tives of its employees on any proposed action which might have a substantial 
effect on the employees' security and economic interests. 236 No later than forty 
days before deciding on such action, central management must forward the in-
formation to local management. 237 In turn, the local management must com-
municate the information to employee representatives. 238 Th.e representatives 
may give an official opinion. 239 If, in the representatives' opinion, the proposed 
decision is likely to have a direct effect on terms of employment or working 
conditions, the representatives can demand consultations with 
management. 240 The Directive specifically requires management to consult 
with labor before making the following decisions: 
a) the closure or transfer of an establishment or major parts 
thereof; 
b) restrictions, extensions or substantial modifications to the 
activity of the undertaking; 
c) major modifications with regard to organization; 
d) and, the introduction of long-term cooperation with other 
undertakings or the cessation of such cooperation. 241 
234. INFORMATION MEMO, supra note 190, at 2. 
Multinational Directive, COM (80) 423 final, Article 5(2) states: 
This information shall relate in particular to: 
(a) structure and manning 
(b) the economic and financial situation 
(c) the situation and probable development of the business and of production and sales 
(d) the employment situation and probable trends 
(e) production and investment programmes 
(I) rationalization plans 
(g) manufacturing and working methods, in particular the introduction of new working 
methods 
(h) all procedures and plans liable to have a substantial effect on employees' interests. 
This list was previously presented and approved in Article 120 of the Proposal for a Council 
Regulation on the Statute for European Companies [19751 BULL. EUR. COMM. (Supp. 4/75) 62 
(1975). See EXPLANATORY MEMO, supra note 20, § II, art. 5, para. 2. 
235. See Vredling Outlines Scope, supra note 66, at 5; see also Social Matters: Mr. Vredling to Propose 
Drawing Up rif EEC Regulations, 2881 EUROPE 7 (Mar. 31, 1980) [hereinafter cited as Vredling Pro-
poses Regs.]' underlining the fact that multinationals make their decisions at high levels unaffected 
by national borders, whereas workers' rights are confined within national borders. 
236. EXPLANATORY MEMO, supra note 20, § II, art. 6; see Multinational Directive, COM (80) 
423 final, art. 6(1). 
237. Multinational Directive, COM (80) 423 final, art. 6(1). 
238. /d. art. 6(3). 
239. See id. art. 6(4). 
240. /d. art. 6(4). 
241. ld. art. 6(2). 
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The Directive requires labor and management to hold all consultations with a 
view toward reaching agreements on measures planned. 242 
1. Information Disclosure 
An information disclosure requirement is not a new idea in labor law. 243 
Both international and domestic labor law have recognized that meaningful 
collective bargaining necessitates informed negotiators. 244 Information, such 
as that required under the Multinational Directive encompassing the entire 
operation of a MNE, is particularly important to employees of the local divi-
sions of a multinational enterprise. 245 Information limited to a local operation 
provides workers with the basis for only partial assessment or perhaps even a 
mistaken assessment of the situation. 246 If the parties met on an informed basis 
in negotiations, they could often avoid unnecessary conflict and dispute. 247 
Labor's skeptical perception of MNEs is a significant factor in such dis-
putes. From the labor point of view, MNEs operate from a global strategy 
which reflects only incidental concern for the impact on employee interests 
within the countries in which a MNE operates. 248 In Western Europe, inac-
cessibility of MNEs' central management fosters apprehension over potential 
job loss among workers. 249 Disclosure of information by MNEs regarding 
their entire operations would diminish this apprehension. 250 Trade unions 
maintain that workers need relevant information to bargain effectively, to 
verify a claim that jobs may be expendable or transferred to other locations, 
and to find alternative solutions.25! However, because a trade union normally 
does not have the power or the resources to collect information about a MNE 
242. !d. art. 6(4). 
243. See R. GORMAN, BASIC TEXT ON LABOR LAW 409-15 (1976), discussing the employer's 
duty to disclose information to employee representatives as required by the National Labor Rela-
tions Act § 8(a)(5) which provides a duty to bargain in good faith. National Labor Relations Act, 
29 U .S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1976). 
244. N.L.R.B. v. Acme Industrial Co., 385 U.S. 432, 435-36 (1967); see N.L.R.B. v. Truitt 
Mfg. Co., 351 U.S. 149, 152-53 (1956); see [LO Tripartite Declaration, supra note 4, art. 54; see 
OECD Guidelines, supra note 4, Chapter on Employment and Industrial Relations, para. 2(b). 
245. INFORMATION MEMO, supra note 190, at 1. 
246. See Vredling Outlines Scope, supra note 66, at 5. 
247. See Kersten, TNCs: A Trade Union View, reprinted in 1 THE CENTRE ON TRANSNATIONAL 
CORPORATIONS REPORTER No.6, at 17, 30 (U.N., 1979) [hereinafter cited as Kersten]. 
248. See Pursey, supra note 12, at 280. 
249. Vredling Proposes Regs., supra note 235, at 7. 
250. See Pursey, supra note 12, at 280. 
251. See EXPLANATORY MEMO, supra note 20, § 11(4); Compare Blake, supra note 111, at 36 (size 
and nature of MNEs contribute to feelings of reduced union effectiveness), with Shearer, supra 
note 143, at 53 (a MNE creates fears of job loss and weakening of union power). 
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from outside sources, the unions need a supply of information directly from 
the MNE itself, as the most efficient and reliable source. 252 
In Western Europe, national laws exist which require enterprises to furnish 
information about local operations to employee representatives. 253 The Euro-
pean approach in this area differs from that of the United States. U. S. law re-
quires MNEs to provide to unions information which is relevant and 
necessary to collective bargaining, as interpreted by the National Labor Rela-
tions Board (NLRB)254 and the courts. 255 European nations allow worker 
participation in decisions affecting the local plant256 through employee repre-
sentatives,257 work councils258 and supervisory boards. 259 National laws re-
quire local management to supply information to workers through these struc-
tures. 260 However, in complying with its obligations to inform worker repre-
sentatives, local management itself may not have information concerning the 
decisions made at MNE headquarters. 261 As the consequences for the 
employees of a particular establishment of a multinational enterprise depend 
not only on what happens locally but, to a great extent, on matters occurring 
in other parts of the enterprise, information possessed by local management 
may be insufficient. 262 Decisions on internal price setting or investment and 
production among other establishments of the multinational may have signifi-
cant impact on local employees. 263 Thus, workers argue that disclosure of in-
formation by MNEs not only aids them in the protection of their interests but 
is also consistent with concepts already accepted in national legislation. 264 
252. See EXPLANATORY MEMO, supra note 20, § 11(4). 
253. See BLANPAIN, supra note 52, at 199-200. 
254. See N.L.R.A., 29 U.S.C. § 153(a) (1976). 
255. Truitt Mfg. Co., 351 U.S., at 152-53; Acme Industrial Co., 385 U.S., at 435-36. 
256. See BLANPAIN, supra note 52, at 199. 
257. See EXPLANATORY MEMO, supra note 20, § 11(2). See e.g., MEINHARDT, supra note 116, § 
16 (Austria, Belgium, Germany, Denmark, France, Luxembourg, Norway, the Netherlands). 
See e.g., Garde, Co-determination in Sweden: Functionsfor Boards with Employee Representatives, 8INT'L 
L. 344 (1974). 
258. See EXPLANATORY MEMO, supra note 20, § II, art. 7. See e.g., Vorbrugg, see note 184, at 
250. See Employee Codetermination, supra note 17, at 949-52, 963. The works council operates on a 
level closer to the ordinary employee and is more concerned with execution than formulation of 
management policies. Id. at 963. 
259. Employee Codetermination, supra note 17, at 949-58. German law places employee represent-
atives on supervisory boards of companies. Id. at 950. See MEINHARDT, supra note 116 (countries 
with supervisory boards are: Austria, Germany and France). 
260. See EXPLANATORY MEMO, supra note 20, S I(A)(3). 
261. See Kujawa, U.S. Labor, Multinational Enterprises, and the National Interest, 10 LAW & POL'y 
INT'L Bus. 941, 950 (1978). But see Shearer, supra note 143, at 57 (arguing the company point of 
view that the local plant is subject to all local labor laws in dealing with workers and unions). 
262. BLANPAIN: TUAC Statement, supra note 12, at 207. 
263. Id. at 207. 
264. Austria and West Germany are nations with national legislation in this area. See Ex· 
PLANATORY MEMO, supra note 20, S 11(5). Arbeitsverfassungsgesetz [ArbVg] S 92 (Austria, 
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2. The OECD and ILO on Information Disclosure 
It is helpful to compare the Multinational Directive with the OECD and 
ILO codes because the EEC Commission has chosen these codes as the 
foundation for the Directive's objectives. 265 Both the OECD Guidelines and 
the ILO Tripartite Declaration contain information disclosure provisions. 
The OECD Guidelines require MNEs to provide labor with information 
which is needed for "meaningful negotiations." 266 According to a report issued 
by the OECD, the word "meaningful" is a useful operational term to persons 
experienced in labor relations when applied to the circumstances of each 
case. 267 Paragraph 3 of the Guidelines requires MNEs to provide information 
on the enterprise as a whole, in accordance with nationallaw. 268 Information 
disclosure is a controversial area of industrial and social policy within OECD 
member countries. Therefore, the formulators of the Guidelines considered 
the listing of items to be covered by this provision to be impractical. 269 
The ILO Tripartite Declaration also states that multinational enterprises 
should supply worker representatives with information required for meaning-
ful negotiations and for a fair view of the enterprise as a whole. 270 As the 
OECD Guidelines, the ILO Declaration does not define the terms of 
disclosure in detail. 271 The declared purpose of the ILO Tripartite Declaration 
1976); Law of May 4, 1976 [1976] BGB1 1 1153 (W. Ger.); See generally Van Langendonck, supra 
note 19. 
265. EXPLANATORY MEMO, supra note 20, S I(A)(4). 
266. OECD Guidelines, supra note 4, Chapter on Employment and Industrial Relations 2(b). 
"[Enterprises should] provide to representatives of employees information which is needed for 
meaningful negotiations on conditions of employment." !d. 
267. THE REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT AND MULTINA-
TIONAL ENTERPRISES ON THE REVIEW OF THE 1976 DECLARATION AND DECISIONS ON INTERNA-
TIONAL INVESTMENT AND MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES" 63,64 as cited in R. BLANPAIN, THE 
OECD GUIDELINES FOR MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES AND LABOUR RELATIONS: 1976-79, at 
213 (1969) [hereinafter cited as BLANPAIN: IME REPORT]. 
268. OECD Guidelines, supra note 4, Chapter on Employment and Industrial Relations, 
para. 3. "[Enterprises should] provide to representatives of employees where this accords with 
local law and practice, information which enables them to obtain a true and fair view of the per-
formance of the entity or, where appropriate, the enterprise as a whole." 
269. BLANPAIN, IME REPORT" 64, 65, supra note 267, at 214. 
270. ILO Tripartite Declaration, supra note 4, art. 54. 
54. Multinational Enterprises should provide workers' representative with information 
required for meaningful negotiations with the entity involved and where this accords 
with local law and practices, should also provide information to enable them to obtain a 
.true and fair view of the entity or, where appropriate, of the enterprise as a whole. 
!d. 
271. This lack of definition may indicate the difficulty in the tripartite structure in reaching 
agreement on their scope and nature. It also reflects a recognition that a variety of circumstances 
may arise in practice. Gunter, The Tripartite Declaration of Principles (lLO): Standards and Follow-up, 
in LEGAL PROBLEMS OF CODES OF CONDUCT FOR MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES 155, 163 (N. 
Horn ed. 1980) [hereinafter cited as Gunter]. 
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is to recognize the important role of multinational enterprises in the area of in-
dustrial relations272 and to maintain standards for workers at least comparable 
to those observed by comparable employers in the countries concerned. 273 
In preparing the Multinational Directive, the EEC Commission followed 
the objectives of the ILO and OECD codes of conduct by requiring MNEs to 
give meaningful information274 to workers directly affected by a MNE's deci-
sion.275 However, unlike the ILO and OECD codes, the Multinational Direc-
tive explicitly outlines the items of information disclosure.276 The list is the 
same list as was earlier approved by the European Parliament in the context of 
a Regulation Establishing a Statute for European Companies. 277 The list also 
corresponds to provisions of national legislation in member states which are 
the most advanced in the field of industrial relations. 278 
3. Consultation 
Labor-management consultation procedures have been in effect in the 
European Economic Community in a context outside of the MNE. 279 Ger-
many first implemented consultation procedures in the coal and steel in-
dustries in an effort to reindustrialize and to restructure that country after 
World War 11.280 Through consultation, the procedures gave labor the oppor-
tunity to express its viewpoint and to better understand the company 
position. 281 This consultation resulted in better job security, less industrial 
strife and a more informed perspective on all sides. 282 Increased awareness 
developed a sense of worker participation and confidence in the company. 283 
Experience in Germany has shown that labor will support measures deemed to 
272. fLO Tripartite Declaration, supra note 4, art. 1; see Gunter, supra note 271, at 162-63. 
273. fLO Tripartite Declaration, supra note 4, art. 40. 
274. EXPLANATORY MEMO, supra note 20, § I(A)(4). 
275. ld. § II(5)(1). 
276. See Multinational Directive, COM (80) 423 final, art. 5(2); see also INFORMATION MEMO, 
supra note 190, at 1. 
277. EXPLANATORY MEMO, supra note 20, § II(5)(2). 
278. !d. The Federal Republic of Germany, The Netherlands and Belgium. 
279. Directive on the Safeguarding of Employees Rights in the Event of Transfer of U ndertak-
ings, 200 0.]. EUR. COMM. (No. L 61) 26, art. 6 (1977). See aLro Wiedemann, Codetermination by 
Workers in German Enterprises, 28 AM.]. COMPo L. 79-81 (1980). 
280. Employee Codetermination, supra note 17, at 949-52. Allied Occupation Authorities actively 
promoted employee codetermination in their efforts to restructure German industry which had 
before and during WWII been a factor in the authoritarian German regime. Industrial leaders, in 
order to avert the threat of full divestiture of their holdings, were willing to compromise on the 
issue. !d. at 950. 
281. fd. at 960. 
282. ld. 
283. See Strauss & Rosenstein, Workers Participation: A Critical View, 9 INDUS. REL. 197, 200, 
212 (1970). 
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increase profitability. m Managerial theory has recognized that workers with 
intimate knowledge of their workplace contribute constructively to 
operations. 285 MNE decisions have a potentially drastic effect on jobs. There-
fore, trade unions emphasize the need for consultation with management to 
discuss their interests before decisions become final. 286 
The very purpose of the Multinational Directive's consultation re-
quirements is to ensure that management and labor conduct these meaningful 
discussions on matters having substantial effect on workers' jobs. 287 However, 
consultation also benefits management by preventing serious social repercus-
sions that result from unilateral decisions.288 The Directive states that the par-
ties must hold consultations before a final decision is made. 289 Management 
must inform employee representatives of impending major decisions and of 
the surrounding facts, in advance of a final decision. 290 This rule gives labor 
the opportunity to express the views of workers on the subject of the 
decision. 291 However, the Multinational Directive ensures that these rules do 
not unduly delay the final decision of the enterprise,292 by requiring that the 
employees' representatives give an opinion within thirty days.293 If the 
representatives agree that the proposed decision is likely to have a direct effect 
on terms of employment or working conditions, the management of the sub-
sidiary or establishment must hold consultations with them "with a view to 
reaching agreement on the measures planned in respect of them. " 294 
4. The OECD and ILO on Consultation 
A reading of the Multinational Directive alongside the OECD and ILO 
codes shows that the Directive incorporates a continuing effort to effectively 
284. See id. at 212; Cf Vagts, Reforming the "Modern" Corporation: Perspective From the German, 80 
HARV. L. REV. 23, 52 (1966)( arguing that the supervisory boards on which labor representatives 
serve often understand little about the company's affairs and thus become a mere rubber stamp 
for management decisions) [hereinafter cited as Vagts, Reforming the Modern Corporation]. The 
Austrian experience has also shown that labor will aid increased productivity. See Traub, supra 
note 235, at 630. 
285. See Lowin, Participative Decision Making: A Model, Literature Critique and Prescriptions for 
Research, 3 ORG. BEHAVIOR AND HUMAN PERFORMANCE 68, 75-76 (1968) (describing the 
enhancement of worker identification with and confidence in the enterprise and utilization of the 
workers' knowledge of local conditions). 
286. See Pursey, supra note 12, at 281-82. Since major decisions which affect workers usually 
originate or are guided from central headquarters, unions believe that they need to have the right 
to consult with the central decision makers. /d. at 286. 
287. Multinational Directive, COM (80) 423 final, art. 6(1). 
288. EXPLANATORY MEMO, supra note 20, § I(A)(4). 
289. Multinational Directive, COM (80) 423 final, art. 6(1). 
290. /d. art. 6( 1 )(3). 
291. /d. art. 6(3). 
292. EXPLANATORY MEMO, supra note 20, § 11(6). 
293. Multinational Directive, COM (80) 423 final, art. 6(3). 
294. /d. art. 6(4). This provision is already in force in all member States under the Directive 
on the Safeguarding of Employee's Rights in the Event of Transfers, 20 OJ. EUR. COMM. (No. 
L 61) 26, art. 6(2) (1977) (regarding what arrangements must be made for employees if the plant 
is transferred away). 
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prevent drastic social dislocations as a result of unilateral MNE decisions. The 
OECD Guidelines do not require consultations, per se, with labor in decisions 
affecting the jobs of workers. However, the Guidelines do provide that where 
the enterprise is considering changes which would have major effects on the 
economic and social welfare of its employees, it should give reasonable notice 
of such changes and cooperate with employee representatives in mitigating the 
adverse effects.295 The Committee on International Investment and Multina-
tional Enterprises296 has stated, in its report on interpretation of the 
guidelines,297 that: 
It seems to the Committee that there is a link between these two 
notions. The notice given has to be sufficiently timely for the pur-
pose of mitigating action to be prepared and put into effect, other-
wise, it would not meet the criterion of 'reasonable.' It would be in 
conformity with the general intention of the paragraph in the light 
of the specific circumstances of each case, if management were 
able to provide such notice prior298 to the final decision being 
taken. 299 
The ILO Tripartite Declaration also calls for consultation with labor on 
matters of mutual concern.300 This provision, like the information disclosure 
provision,301 is broad and does not specifically provide for a right to consulta-
tion. 302 However, when read in conjunction with other provisions of the 
Declaration, it takes on more meaning. For instance, Article 17 303 requires 
consultation with workers' organizations in order to keep manpower plans" as 
far as practicable, in harmony with national social development policies." 304 
The Tripartite Declaration also suggests that MNEs consider security of 
employment when planning and making changes in operations305 and 
endeavor to provide stable employment and social security to their 
295. OECD Guidelines, supra note 4, Chapter on Employment and Industrial Relations, 
para. 6. 
296. This committee was established by the OECD Council Resolution Establishing a Com-
mittee on International Investment and Multinational Enterprises, January 21, 1975, cited in 
BLANPAIN, supra note 52, at 31-32. The OECD established this committee for the purpose of 
strengthening co-operation among member countries of the OECD in the field of international 
investment and MNEs. /d. 
297. BLANPAIN: IME REPORT' 67, supra note 267, at 216. 
298. Emphasis added. 
299. Professor Blanpain, in the conclusions he draws after his study of the OECD Guidelines 
follow-up procedure, states that" 'cooperation' means consultation; 'mitigation' includes look-
ing for alternative solutions." BLANPAIN, supra note 52, at 272. For union views on the subject see 
id. at 147, 151. 
300. ILO Tripartite Declaration, supra note 4, art. 56. 
301. Id. art. 54 (quoted note 270 supra). 
302. Gunter, supra note 271, at 162, "It is evident that no consensus could be achieved on 
detailed standards .... " Id. 
303. ILO Tripartite Declaration, supra note 4, art. 17. 
304. Id. The Article also applies to national employers' organizations and competent govern-
ment authorities. Id. 
305. ILO Tripartite Declaration, supra note 4, art. 24-28. 
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employees.306 The ILO Declaration maintains that MNEs should avoid ar-
bitrary dismissal procedures. 307 Furthermore, it advises MNEs to provide 
reasonable notice" [i]n considering changes in operations which would have 
major employment effects . . . so that the implications may be examined 
jointly in order to mitigate adverse effects to the greatest possible extent." 308 
A reading of the Multinational Directive within the context of the OEeD 
and ILO codes,309 shows that the Directive places emphasis on the practice of 
disclosure. 3lo Organized labor believes that disclosure is necessary to hold 
MNEs accountable for their global operations. 311 Accountability would en-
courage MNE contributions to a balanced international economic and social 
development. 312 The interests of labor are protected by the above disclosure 
and consultation procedures because they provide a system of checks and 
balances on the economic power of multinational enterprises. 313 The require-
ments of consultation and information disclosure would reduce the possibili-
ties of abuse of this power. 314 The consultation provision gives labor the op-
portunity to react to management's decisions with its own measures. 315 
Together, the information disclosure and consultation requirements316 enable 
labor to fully consider the validity of management's claims.317 
This analysis is based on the traditional concept that informed representa-
306. ld. art. 25. 
307. ld. art. 27. 
308. Id. art. 26. "[TJhis is particularly important in the case of the closure ofan entity involv-
ing collective lay-ofTs or dismissal." 
309. See EXPLANATORY MEMO, supra note 20, § I(A)(4). 
310. Accord, Vredling Outlines Scope, supra note 66, at 5. (report on press conference with Vice-
President of the Commission Vredling, who said the principal aim of the Directive was to achieve 
transparency of multinationals). 
311. See Pursey, supra note 12, at 283. 
312. See Tapiola, supra note 168, at 291. 
313. See Kersten, supra note 247, at 17, 30. 
314. Id. 
315. See Employee Codetermination, supra note 17, at 960. But if. Vagts, R~orming the Modern Cor-
poration, supra note 284, at 73-74 (often labor and management actually share compatible objec-
tives in corporate strategies). 
316. Multinational Directive, COM (80) 423 final, arts. 5, 6. 
317. See id. art. 6(1). 
[iJt shall be required to forward precise information to the management of each of its 
subsidiaries within the Community not later than forty days before adopting the deci-
sion, giving details of: 
- the grounds for the proposed decision 
- the legal, economic and social consequences of such decisions for the employees con-
cerned 
- the measures planned in respect of these employees. 
Id. Cf INFORMATION MEMO, supra note 190, at 2 (clear and complete picture can be supplied 
where local procedures for consultation and information are inconsistent with the structure of the 
entity as a whole); if. Vredling Proposes Regs., supra note 235, at7 (reporting on press conference at 
which Mr. Vredling said prevention of a deterioration in industrial relations could be accom-
plished because transparency would prevent decisions being imposed from abroad without 
employees being in any position to understand the underlying reasons). 
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tion in collective bargaining strengthens union organizations. m However, 
although an adequate means of acquiring information is necessary for effective 
union bargaining with a MNE, m information disclosure alone is insufficient 
because of the difficulty encountered in identifying the real bargaining posi-
tion of the MNE.320 A MNE has production facilities in different countries 
and thus makes policy while considering global factors. It can juggle its ac-
counting statements by setting artificial prices for transfers between the parent 
enterprise and/or subsidiaries, and by manipulating dividends, tax payments 
and capital movements.3a1 To have an effective bargaining position, labor 
needs more than raw information about a MNEj it needs to have the oppor-
tunity to discuss with and question management about this information. m 
Through such consultation, labor can establish a countervailing power. m 
This posture would enable labor, as a bargaining partner, to influence MNE 
decisions. sa. Without consultation, though, the balance of bargaining posi-
tions shifts in favor of tlle MNE.m Consultation, by establishing a close 
observance of MNE activities,m would also help ensure that MNEs conform 
with national economic and social objectives, as required by the GECD 
Guidelines. m Since one major purpose of the Multinational Directive is to en-
sure harmonious development of activities within the EEC by creating a 
balanced bargaining position between labor and MNEs,m the EEC Commis-
sion considers the combination of information disclosure and consultation 
regulations as important to achievement of this balance. m 
E. Tn, Binding Natur, of th, DirlCtiv, 
The GECD and ILG codes depend exclusively on a company's good will for 
their implementation. Because the codes are not binding, the EEC Commis-
sion claims that they fail to meet their intended objectives.m According to the 
Commission, a legal framework is necessary which would be binding on all 
318. S" MULTINATIONAL CHALLENGE, supra note 160, at 11-12, 40. 
319. Purlcy, supra note 12, at 280. 
320. HANOBOOK FOR NEGOTIATORS, supra note 156, at 58; Sll MULTINATIONAL CHAI.LENGE, 
supra note 160, at 58. 
321. MULTINATIONAL CHALLENGE, supra note 160, at 57. 
322. HANOBOOK FOR NEGOTIATORS, supra note 156, at 58. 
323. S" id.; MULTINATIONAL CHALLENGE, supra note 160, at 40. 
324. S" HANDBOOK FOR NEGOTIATORS, supra note 156. at 32. 58; MULTINATIONAl. CHAl.· 
!.ENGE, supra note 160, at 40. 
325. S" MULTINATIONAL CHALLENGE. supra note 160. at 19. 58. 
326. S" MULTINATIONAL CHALLENGE, supra note 160. at 59; EXPLANATORY MEMO. supra note 
20, § I(A)(4). 
327. DECO Guidelines. supra note 4. General Policies, para. 2. 
328. S" EXPLANATORY MEMO. supra note 20, H I(A)(I)-(4). 
329. S" id. H I(A)(I)-(4), 1l(4). 
330. Vr,dliTl6 Oullin,s ScOPl, supra note 66, at 5. 
331. INFORMATION MEMO, supra note 190, at 2. 
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enterprises operating within the EEC. 331 Thus, the Commission suggested its 
proposal for a Multinational Directive as the ideal means of achieving a 
Community-wide set of rules which multinational enterprises must follow. 332 
The Directive would require member states333 to establish "r a lppropriate 
penalties [against a MNE] in case of failure to fulfill the obligations laid 
down" in the Directive. 334 If a MNE did fail to consult with or to provide in-
formation to employees prior to making a decision with substantial effect on 
the interests of employees, the Directive would require states to give the con-
cerned employee representatives "the right of appeal to tribunals or other 
competent national authorities for measures to be taken to protect their in-
terests. " 335 
The theory behind the OECD Guidelines is that public pressure would 
make MNEs adhere to the voluntary guidelines. 336 Unfortunately, the nature 
of MNEs has made it difficult to discern when a MNE has made a decision or 
provided complete information. 337 Trade unions argue that MNEs have con-
tinued to violate the spirit of the voluntary codes and further, unions feel that 
the violations will continue unless binding rules and firm government action 
compel MNEs to adhere to the codes. 338 The Directive makes information 
available which unions can use to assert pressure on a MNE to respect the re-
quirements set down by law and by declaration. 339 Once all of the information 
relevant to a decision to transfer operations is available to labor, 340 the 
decision-making process of a MNE, in theory, will be transparent to trade 
unions.341 The formulators of the codes of conduct designed them to har-
332. See EXPLANATORY MEMO, supra note 20, § 11(6). 
333. Business Brief, Worker Consultation, 715 European Report 3,4 (Sept. 30, 1980). 
334. Multinational Directive, COM (80) 423 final, arts. 5(6), 6(6). 
335. !d. art. 6(6). 
336. See BLANPAIN, supra note 52, at 59-60 (the guidelines are morally binding with a relation-
ship to societal principles of right and wrong). 
337. See Van Langendonck, supra note 19, at 86-87. See § II supra. 
338. BLANPAIN: TUAC Statement, supra note 12, at 103. TUAC stressed that it considered the 
OECD Guidelines as a first step which should lead to further international agreements. !d. 
In an official position paper, (ETUC Evaluation, supra note 18) the European Trade Union 
Council (ETUC) called the binding character of the Multinational Directive, the Directive's 
most important aspect. !d. § 3.1. The ETUC position views the Directive as necessary to comple-
ment the OECD and ILO Codes of Conduct. ld. § 1.2. 
339. Cj. EXPLANATORY MEMO, supra note 20, § I(A)(4) (this legal framework will constitute a 
stepping stone to Cfpation of a uniform operating environment); cj. Van Langendonck, supra note 
19, at 89-90 (arguing for a solution that provides a way for removal of all pretexts for evading na-
tionallabor laws). 
340. See ETUC Evaluation, supra note 18, §§ 1.3, 2.2. See also Vredling Outlines Scope, supra note 
66, at 5. 
341. Vredling Proposes Regs., supra note 235, at 7. Cj. Tapiola, supra note 168, at 291 (the effec-
tiveness of the Guidelines is stymied by the fact that enterprises can accept or reject the voluntary 
guidelines at will). See also Pursey, supra note 12. 
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monize the interests of labor with the policies of MNEs.342 Unions need to 
determine whether a MNE's management is harmonizing these interests. The 
availability of information makes the determination possible with or without 
regulations. But binding regulations ensure that trade unions have access to 
the information. 
VI. ApPLICATION OF THE EEC DIRECTIVE 
TO THE RUNAWAY PLANT PROBLEM 
Organized labor in Europe considers the Multinational Directive important 
with respect to labor's ability to bargain effectively with the management of 
MNEs.343 One example of the Directive's potential effectiveness is its applica-
tion to the runaway plant problem. 
The "runaway plant" or "shop" has been defined as "an industrial plant 
moved by its owners from one location to another to escape union labor 
regulations or state laws." 344 Employers use this device either to prevent 
unionization or to escape bargaining with an established union by permanent-
ly shutting down a plant in one location and reopening at a new, usually dis-
tant, site. 345 
342. See fLO Tripartite Declaration, supra note 4, art. 10. 
343. See ETUC Evaluation, supra note 18, §§ 1.1, 3.1. 
344. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY 1979 (P. Gove, ed., 1976). 
345. [1972] 3 LAB. L. REP. (CCH) '4090, Lockouts, Shutdowns, Runaway Shops. In the United 
States, under the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), (National Labor Relations Act, 29 
U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(1), (3) & (5)(1976», the "runaway shop" (See Garwin Corp. v. N.L.R.B., 347 
F.2d 295, 297 (D.C. Cir. 1967», is said to be the closing of a plant and the moving of operations 
in order to deprive the company's employees the rights to organize and bargain collectively. Sec-
tions 158(a)(I), (a)(3) and (a)(5) have been used in numerous cases to charge that plant shut-
downs taken with an anti-union animus are unfair labor practices. See e.g., New Madrid Mfg. 
Co., 104 N.L.R.B. 117 (1953); S. & K. Knee Pants Co., 2 N.L.R.B. 940 (1937); Rome Prod-
ucts Co., 77 N.L.R.B. 1217 (1948); Schieber Millinery Co., 26 N.L.R.B. 937 (1940); Rapid 
Bindery Inc., 127 N.L.R.B. 212 (1960); N.L.R.B. v. Winchester Electronics Inc., 295 F.2d 288 
(2d Cir. 1961). Companies also use the runaway shop to discourage collective employee activities 
in the future. See Textile Workers Union v. Darlington Mfg. Co., 380 U.S. 263, 273 (1965). 
Companies can also use such plant closures as a threat for bargaining purposes in order to get 
concessions from the union. See e.g., Sidelle Fashions Inc., 133 N.L.R.B. 547 (1961), enforced in 
N.L.R.B. v. Sidelle Fashions Inc., 305 F.2d 825 (3d Cir. 1962). 
Proponents oflabor accept the N.L.R.A. in the U.S. as a tool to be used to protect employee 
interests in the face of employers' superior economic strength. See generally Comment, The 
N.L.R.B. 's Pursuit of the Runaway Shop, 7 VILL. L. REV. 450, 454 (1962) rhereinafter cited as 
NLRB Pursuit]; Frenkel, The Runaway Shop, 12 CLEVELAND-MARSHALL L. REV. 523 (1963); 
Note, "Runaway Shop" a Perennial Threat to Organized Labor, 37 NOTRE DAME LAW. 357 (1962) 
rhereinafter cited as Runaway Shop]. One of the major policies that Congress intended to imple-
ment by passage of the NLRA was to promote: "rthe flow of commerce] by encouraging practices 
fundamental to the friendly adjustment of industrial disputes arising out of differences as to 
wages, hours, or other working conditions, and by restoring equality of bargaining power be-
tween employers and employees." NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1976). 
The NLRA does not place employer interests in a secondary position in relation to union in-
terests. Cj NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1976), (the purpose of the statute is also to ensure that 
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A. Runaway Plant at the International Level 
The multinational nature of the MNE puts it outside the reach of national 
laws designed to prevent undesirable tactics like the runaway plant. 346 Unions 
must rely on local laws which govern each plant. Therefore, any attempt by 
labor to balance the power of MNEs with strong collective employee action 
can be ineffective if these local laws are inapplicable to the central manage-
ment of a MNE.l+7 
MNE decisions can also affect the social balance within individual 
nations. 348 While laws designed to promote industrial stability operate effec-
tively in the context of industrial relations with local business enterprises, the 
jobs provided by MNEs remain insecure. 349 Such job insecurity affects large 
numbers of workers and is a menace to local social stability. 350 The power of a 
device such as the runaway plant makes even the threat of its use a potent 
weapon.351 For this reason, both the OEeD Guidelines and the ILO Tripar-
tite Declaration352 have declared the threat of plant transfer, in order to force 
concessions from labor, an unfair method of influencing negotiations. 353 
unions do not engage in certain unfair labor practices). Rather the NLRA acknowledges the im-
portance of both interests. NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1976). In the circumstances of a plant 
closure, these opposing interests clash. See Runaway Shop, supra at 357. 
From the point of view of the union, which attempts to bargain for concessions from manage-
ment and protect the job security of its members, the runaway shop poses a dilemma. !d. While 
the union may use its collective strength to bargain with the employer, the use of that strength 
may cause the employer to close down the plant and relocate. The effect of this dilemma is to put 
unions in the position of having to choose between effective economic bargaining power and the 
job security of the employees. See NLRB Pursuit, supra, at 452. Even the threat of a runaway shop 
made by management may interfere with the union's ability to maintain a collective strength. !d. 
See Lea, Multinational Companies and Trade Union Interests, in THE MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISE 
147, at 152 (J. Dunning ed. 1971). 
346 .. Cox, supra note 10, at 353. See Blake, supra note Ill, at 36-37; Van Langendonck, supra 
note 19, at 3. 
347. See Van Langendonck, supra note 19, at 3. Articles 41 and 48 of the ILO Tripartite 
Declaration recognize the rights of workers to organize and bargain collectively pursuant to local 
laws. See ILO Tripartite Declaration, supra note 4, arts. 41, 48. 
348. See Cox, supra note 10, at 348; see EXPLANATORY MEMO, supra note 20, § I(A)(4). 
349. See Van Langendonck, supra note 19, at 3. 
350. See Cox, supra note 10, at 349-51. 
351. The OECD Guidelines have specifically recognized the problem of this threat and in-
clude a provision concerning it in the voluntary guidelines. See OECD Guidelines, supra note 4, 
Chapter on Employment and Industrial Relations, art. 8. A MNE should: 
Id. 
[iln the context of bonafide negotiations· with representatives of employees on condi-
tions of employment or while employees are exercising a right to organize, not threaten 
to utilize a capacity to transfer the whole or part of an operating unit from the country 
concerned in order to influence unfairly those negotiations or to hinder the exercise of a 
right to organize. • Bona fide negotiations may include labour disputes as part of the 
process of negotiation. . .. 
352. Compare OECD Guidelines, supra note 4, Chapter on Employment and Industrial Rela-
tions, art. 8, with ILO Tripartite Declaration, supra nOte 4, art. 52. 
353. See OECD Guidelines, supra note 4, Introduction, para. 6; see ILO Tripartite Declaration, 
supra note 4, art. 52. 
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As in the United States,3H unions and government encounter difficulties in 
deterl!lining whether plant transfer is motivated by economic or by anti-union 
reasons. 355 Anti-union motives are rarely the sole reason for plant 
relocation. 356 Enterprises usually relocate plants because of detrimental 
economic factors at the current location and expectations of better economic 
conditions at the new site. 357 In fact, increases in labor costs may be a major 
economic factor behind such decisions. 358 Modern management uses detailed 
systems analysis and careful study to decide whether to relocate a plant. 359 
Therefore, a company is unlikely to make a relocation decision based on only 
one factor such as anti-unionism. 
Management's position is that regulations which restrict plant relocations 
prevent a company from making economically justified relocations. 360 
Management often feels that potential conflict with labor laws forces it into a 
position of being reluctant to make these decisions. 361 Management argues 
that unions can impose higher labor costs by increasing wage levels and by 
blocking implementation of employment practices designed to reduce costs. 362 
They also see powerful unions as having the ability to cause artificially high 
wage levels. 363 
For several reasons, MNEs. are not as mobile as adversaries believe. 364 
First, production in most industries is dependent on long-term investment. 365 
Management cannot easily shift such long-term investment without suffering 
a large loss of investment capital. 366 Second, finding large enough production 
354. In attempting to formulate a rule, the NLRB has determined that relocations made for 
economic reasons are valid, while those made for anti-union motives are wrongful. Compare 
Schieber Millinery Co., 26 N.L.R.B. 937 (1940) (move to thwart unions is runaway) with Krantz 
Wire & Mfg. Co., 97 N.L.R.B. 977 (1952) (relocation for economic reasons is valid). See generally 
Note, The Runaway Shop - An Impediment to Peaceful Union-Management Relations, 34 TEMPLE L.Q. 
139 (1961) [hereinafter cited as Impediment1; Note, The Effect oj Relocation or Sale oj Industry Upon 
Labor-Management Relations, 5 W. RES. L. REV. 84 (1953) [hereinafter cited as lijfect of Relocation1; 
NLRB Pursuit, supra note 345, at 455-57. The NLRB, though, has had difficulty separating the 
anti-union intention when there was a mixed economic/anti-union motive. See Mt. Hope 
Finishing Co. v. N.L.R.B., 211 F.2rl '1fi~ (4th Cil. 1951) (wullrdus"d to enlurec 1J0ard order 
where compRny was wnsidering move for economic reasons and finally decided to actually move 
when union came along). 
355. See BLANPAIN: IME REPORT, supra note 267, para. 46, at 98; see also BLANPAIN, supra note 
52, at 204-05. 
356. Swift, Plant Relocation: Catching Up with the Runaway Shop, 14 B.C. IND. & COMM. L. REV. 
1135, 1137 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Swift1. 
357. !d. 
358. See id. 
359. See generally F. MOORE, MANUFACTURING MANAGEMENT, 197-219 (4th ed. 1965). 
360. !d., at 170; Swift, supra note 356, at 1138. 
361. Swift, supra note 356, at 1138. 
362. !d. 
363. !d. 
364. C. BERGSTEIN, T. HORST & T. MORAN, AMERICAN MULTINATIONALS AND AMERICAN 
INTF.RESTS, 101 (1978) [hereinafter cited as AMERICAN MULTINATIONALS1· 
365. Id. 
366. !d. 
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capacity to justify a plant relocation is very difficult. 367 Third, if the produc-
tion cannot be shifted in a short period of time, a MNE is vulnerable to 
disruption as the various components of the enterprise are often dependent on 
each other. 368 Fourth, assets which a MNE does not transfer may be lost to the 
government of the deserted country. 369 Fifth, subsidiaries are subject to local 
laws of the country in which they operate. 370 Frequently, these laws require a 
corporation to make severance payments to dismissed workers. This imposes a 
large expense on the MNE. 371 The problems associated with transferring pro-
duction are thus likely to discourage the occurrence of a runaway plant. 372 
Losses in investment capital, production lags, lost assets and large expenses 
for actual transfers suggest that MNE management would not readily consider 
the idea in its relations with labor.373 Management is obligated to consider the 
interests of its investors. It, therefore, must weigh the implications of plant 
closings for those investors against employment policies. 374 
The fact that a MNE's use of the illegitimate threat of plant transfer as a 
method of influencing negotiations is a matter of international concern is 
evidenced by its specific proscription by the OECD and ILO.375 Because mixed 
motive situations are much more difficult to detect than illegitimate threats ,376 
labor has presented as its position in the EEC, 377 the OECD378 and the IL0379 
that disclosure of information and consultation requirements 
would enable unions to determine the validity of economic reasons for MNE 
decisions380 and to offer possible alternative solutions designed to protect their 
jobS. 381 Trade unions and their negotiators are skilled at developing solutions 
for defending the interests of workers while cooperating with management to 
367. /d. 
368. AMERICAN MULTINATIONALS, supra note 364, at 100·01. 
369. /d. 
370. /d. 
371. /d. 
372. /d. 
373. /d. 
374. See Guertin, supra note 6, at 300. 
375. OECD Guidelines, supra note 4, Chapter on Employment and Industrial Relations, art. 
8; [LO Tripartite Declaration, supra note 4, art. 52. 
376. CI, BLANPAIN, supra note 52, at 189 (full judgment of the factual case is necessary for 
labor to take a position on economic decisions). 
377. See ETUC Evaluation, supra note 18, § 1.1. ETUC is labor's representative organization in 
the EEC and has published this position paper in support of the Multinational Directive. /d. 
378. See The Need for Meetings with Multinationals at the Decision-making Level (Mar. 30, 
1977) (unpublished paper submitted by the International Metalworkers Federation to the Com-
mittee on International Investment and Multinational Enterprises) reprinted in R. BLANPAIN, THE 
OECD GUIDELINES FOR MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES AND LABOUR RELATIUNS; 1976-1979, at 
188 (1979) fhereinafter cited as BLANPAIN: Need for Meetings]. 
379. See e.g., fLO Tripartite Declaration, supra note 4, art. 54 (information for a true and fair view 
of the entity as a whole). 
380. See BLANPAIN: Need for Meetings, supra note 378, at 188-89. 
381. See id.; see also .Pursey, supra note 12, at 279-83. 
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solve particular plant level problems. 382 Information disclosure affords labor 
representatives the opportunity to receive a full and fair view of the enterprise 
as a whole. 383 Consultation procedures enable a presentation of union and 
management views on employment and social issues within a MNE. 384 
Discussion and analysis of these issues by both sides facilitates solutions to dif-
ficult problems at the plant level while maintaining a concern with employ-
ment security. 385 
B. The Runaway Plant under the OEeD and fLO 
The expressed intention of the EEC Commission to follow the objectives of 
both the GECD and ILG codes is significant in a consideration of the runaway 
plant issue. 386 Within both the GECD and ILG codes there is language 
directed at management's use of the threat to transfer as bargaining power. 387 
In the Chapter on Employment and Industrial Relations,388 the GECD 
Guidelines state that the enterprise should: 
in the context of bona fide negotiations389 with representatives of 
employees on conditions of employment or while employees are 
exercising a right to organize, not threaten to utilize a capacity to 
transfer the whole or part of an operating unit from the country 
concerned in order to influence unfairly those negotiations or to 
hinder the exercise of a right to organize. 390 
The key notion391 of this paragraph is the word' 'unfair. "392 A distinction 
must be made between legitimate information given "on likely consequences 
for the future of the firm as a going concern of the eventual outcome of such 
negotiations, and threats which would be an unfair use of the management's 
negotiating power. " 393 However, the provision reserves the legitimate right of 
382. See BLANPAIN: Need for Meetings, supra note 378, at 188-89. 
383. EXPLANATORY MEMO, supra note 20, § I(A)(3). 
384. BLANPAIN: Need for Meetings, supra note 378, at 189-90. 
385. See id. 
386. See EXPLANATORY MEMO, supra note 20, § I(A)(4). See § V.E supra. 
387. OECD Guidelines, supra note 4, Chapter on Employment and Industrial Relations, 
para. 8. For the exact language of the OECD provision, see note 351 supra; [LO Tripartite Declara-
tion, supra note 4, art. 52. 
388. OECD Guidelines, supra note 4. 
389. "Bonafide negotiations may include labour disputes as part of the process of negotiation. 
Whether or not labour disputes are so included will be determined by the law and prevailing 
employment practices of particular countries." OECD Guidelines, supra note 4, Chapter on 
Employment and Industrial Relations, art. 8 note. 
390. !d. 
391. BLANPAIN, supra note 52, at 228. 
392. Unfair: "r a.l marked by injustice, partiality or deception; b. providing an insufficient or 
inequitable basis for judgment evaluation; c. not according with merit or importance." 
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY 2494 (P. Gove ed. 1976). 
393. BLANPAIN: IME REPORT, supra note 267, '69, at 226. 
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managementS94 to point out or to predict potential adverse impacts of 
employee-concerted activities. m 
The ILO Tripartite Declaration contains a provision with wording nearly 
identical to that of the OEOD Guidelines. m The underlying spirit of the ILO 
Declaration is to expect MNEs to be model employers in all areas covered by 
the ILO Declaration. s9? Therefore, because information disclosure and con-
sultation procedures would reveal illegitimate motivations in threatened 
transferss98 and because legally binding procedures would expose the MNE to 
sanctions, m the Multinational Directive would help to dispel the perception of 
the runaway plant as a real problem.40o 
VII. MANAGEMENT REACTION 
In part, the management of MNEs are worried about the multitude of un-
coordinated efforts aimed at controlling their activities. 401 Management views 
these efforts as reactions to isolated problems having little or no regard for con-
sistency between requirements. tot This inconsistency confuses management 
about what actions are acceptable and uncertain of what to expect by way of 
government response to those actions. 405 
Thus, management generally opposes measures like the Multinational 
Directive.404 The international business community opposes such measures 
because it feels that misconceptions exist as to how MNEs operate and as to 
394-. This concept has been extensively developed In U.S. law. S" N.L.R.A., 29 U.S.C. § 
1~8(c) (1916) (protecting the expreulon or dluemlnatlon of any vil'ws, arR\lment or opinion as 
!'ree speech, so long as no threat and no promises ofbeneflt Atl' rontained therein). Sit IIlso BLAN· 
PAIN, Suprll note ~2, at 228. 
Unfair labot practice - "an act, whether by employer or employee, in violation of the regula-
tions and prohibitions of a labor relations act." BAI.U;N'tINt.'~ LAW DIC'tIONARY 131~ (3d ed. 
1969). Sit "rI,miry Employ" Frtt Sprrcla, 3 LAB. L. Rp'tR. (CCH) , 5010-5025. 
395. COmpllrt N.L.R.B. v. J. Automotive Controls Corp., 4-06 F.2d 221, 223-24- (10th Clr. 
1969) (speech that together with other statements implied syllogism that plant with Increased 
cosu must move, I.e., union would Increase costs, therefore, union would cause closure, was 
merely lawful prediction of dire economic consequences !'rom unionization), willi Farmer's Co-
operative Co. 102 N.L.R.B. 14-4-, 14-4--4-5 (1953) (employer statement to employee that unioniza-
tion of company would probably mean less take-home pay, even though couched In the form of 
an opinion, constituted Implied threat nf reprisal and was, therefore, a violation). 
!i96. lLU 1'ripllrlitr Dleillm/iorl, supm note 4-, art. 52. 
391. Q'(lnter, supm note 211, at 162. 
398. S" Van Langendonck, supm note 19, at 85-86. S" supm J VI.A. 
399. SIt Multinational Directive, COM (80) 4-23 final, arts. 5(5) at 6(6). 
4-00. S" Van Langendonck, supm note 20, at 8~-86. 
4-01. R. H£LLMAN, TRANSNA'tIONAL CONTROL OP MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS 2 (M. 
Freldberg, trans. 1911) [hereinafter cited as H£LLMANI. 
4-02. Id. at 2. 
4-03. Id. 
4-04-. S" EEC lrJduslrils Oppos,d, supm note ~, at 15. 
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what motivations affect MNE decisions. toS Management of MNEs are also 
concerned with the interests of their investors. IUch allimiting excess costs and 
protecting profitl. 40B If they do not protect thele interests. management fears 
that disinvestment in enterprisel operating in Europe would result. 401 
The businen lector relistance to dilclosure and consultation procedures is 
due to the belief that thele procedures are costly and that they might create gen-
uine competitive disadvantages. 408 Although the Multinational Directive 
recognizesto, the need to prevent the disclosure of secrets. 4lO business worries 
that the Directive lackl a guarantee that would effectively protect company 
secrets. 411 Without such a guarantee. competition with firms in countries out-
side of the EEe might be hampered. m 
In general. management of MNEs do not oppose disclosure of information 
procedures as established in the voluntary codes. m Information disclosure 
tends to produce a cleansing effect.m Management of MNEs feel disclosure 
will improve the investment climate by resolving the labor and social problems 
associated with MNEa.m However. the management of MNEs desire flex-
ibility in interpretation of codes in order to be able to work within the circum-
stances of each particular situation. m 
Management proponents have indicated some problem areas concerning 
information disclosure. m Businessmen have pointed out that disclosure of 
certain kinds of information. such as operating statistics by geographic area. 
could create competitive disadvantage. especially where a firm has only one or 
40~. S" UNICE POSI'l'ION, SUPPII note 9~, at paral. 10·13. S" Barran, sUPPII note 91, at 164; s" 
AMERICAN MULTINATIONALS, supra note 364, at 100·01. With relpect to the runaway plant, as 
dilculled in section VI sU/JPII, bUlinell leade" believe there are also many milconceptionl. Id. 
406. Guertin, sUPPII note 6, at 300. 
407. UNICE POSITION, su/JPII note 9~, at para. 24. Internal Market, Work" Participalioll, 705 
EUROPEAN REPORT 8 QuI. 2~, 1980). 
408. UNICE POSll'ION, sU/JPII note 9~, at paral. 19·24. 
409. S" Multinational Dlrectlv!", COM (80) 4:.13 final, art. 1~. Although trade lecrets ought to 
be guarded. drrlnrhllliniormation to be confidential simply to prevent divulgence of information 
is unacceptable. Paragraph 2 of Article 1~ providel that tribunals or other national bodiellhould 
be empowered to lettle any disputel relating to the confidentiality of certain informlltinn. S" Ex· 
PLANATORY MEMO, supra note 20, S U(5). 
410. For example, disclosure of pricing policies could reveal COlt elements and profit margins. 
BLANPAIN, supra note 52, at 89. 
411. UNICE POSITION, sU/JPII note 95, at para. 21. S" EEC Illduslri,s O/Jpos,d, sU/JPII note 5, at 
15. 
412. UNICE POSITION, sU/JPII note 95, at para. 23. 
413. S" id. at paral. 1·4. S" also BLANPAIN, sU/JPII note 52, at 78. 
414. S" Vagta, Disc/osurt aM Mullill4lioll4/ EII""'"s,: TA, Cosls of Illumill4lioll, in LEGAL PROB-
LEMS OF CODES OF CONDUCT FOR MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES 315, at 317 (N. Horn ed. 1980) 
rhereinafter cited as Vagts, Cosls of Illumill4liolll. 
415. SIt BLANPAIN, sU/JPII note 52, at 21. 
416. Guertin, sU/JPII note 6, at 298. 
417. SIt note 171, su/JPII. 
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a few customers in a particular region. +18 Disclosure of pricing policies would 
reveal cost element and profit margins which would conflict with the need for 
business confidentiality. m Similarly, a need for confidentiality exists with 
respect to future plans. 420 With competitors operating in areas outside the 
EEC and, therefore, outside EEC jurisdiction, disclosure rules would create a 
disadvantage for a MNE because its information would be accessible to com-
petitors which might not be subject to similar requirements. W These disad-
vantages could force all but the most efficient MNEs out of existence. 422 This 
would result in a negative long range effect for investors and for nations which 
lose the investment. +23 
Currently, the laws of home countries of most MNEs require some form of 
accounting to shareholders. +24 However, there is a diversity of national report-
ing and disclosure requirements.+25 To coordinate information from various 
parts of the enterprise to supply a labor organization with complete informa-
tion would be expensive for MNEs. +26 Additionally, information which is 
already compiled for investors might be deficient when considered for other 
purposes, thus requiring completely new accountings of enterprise 
operations. +27 
Balance sheets reflect historic costs, rather than current value. 428 Financial 
reports may show only the status of the enterprise as a whole. This informa-
tion is useful for investment analysis, but it lacks sufficient employee-related 
factors to enable union leaders to determine labor's relative value in the par-
ticular MNE. +29 Thus, disclosure to labor is likely to add new requirements to 
MNE information systems. +30 Depending on the extent to which MNEs 
already produce the required data, +31 the cost of gathering, recording and col-
418. BLANPAIN, supra note 52, at 89. 
419. /d. 
420. Pursey, supra note 12, at 284. 
421. See UNICE POSITION, supra note 95, at para. 19; see also Vagts, Costs of Illumination, supra 
note 414, at 318-19. 
422. Knortz, The Means of Regulating Multinational Corporations § II, in THE FUTURE OF THE 
U.S. MULTINATIONAL CORPORATION 104,111 (L. Unterman & C. Swent eds. 1975). 
423. UNICE POSITION, supra note 95, at paras. 19-24. 
424. Vagts, Costs of Illumination, supra note 414, at 326. 
425. /d. It should be noted here that the EEC Commission has already issued comprehensive 
guidelines on accounting with the purpose of harmonizing accounting rules in memb.,r states. 
Fourth Council Directive of July 25, 19711,21 OJ. EUR. COMM. (No. L 222) 11 (Aug. 14, 1978) 
(based on Article 54(3)(g) of the Treaty). 
426. See Vagts, Costs of Illumination, supra note 414, at 318; see also UNICE POSITION, supra note 
95, at para. 22. 
427. See Vagts, Costs of Illumination, supra note 414, at 327. 
428. See T. FIFLIS & H. KRIPKE, ACCOUNTING FOR BUSINESS LAWYERS 112 (2d ed. 1977). 
429. See Vagts, Costs of Illumination, supra note 414, at 330; see also Kay, Disclosure and Collective 
Bargaining, 1973J. Bus. L. 26 (1973). 
430. See Vagts, Costs of Illumination, supra note 414, at 318; see also UNICE POSITION, supra note 
95, at para. 22. 
431. Vagts, Costs of Illumination, supra note 414, at 318. 
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lating this data will be expensive. 432 For example, data collected and produced 
in one form may not be easily retranslated into another form.433 
The Multinational Directive has attracted a considerable amount of con-
troversy in the EEC.434 Unions support the proposal435 while business has an-
nounced its strong opposition. 436 The business sector takes the position that 
existing voluntary codes are sufficient and preferable to enforce legislation. 437 
The Union of Industries (UNICE) of the EEC has stated that the Directive is 
unnecessary.438 Although labor has complained that the GECD and ILG 
codes do not provide workers with sufficient access to management,439 
UNICE points outHO that the GECD has recently found its guidelines to be 
operating satisfactorily. Hi Thus, MNEs favor the current voluntary GECD 
and ILG codes and call for a continued effort to extend awareness of these 
codes. H2 
VIII. LABOR AND MANAGEMENT: RECOMMENDATIONS 
FOR BALANCING THE INTERESTS 
In spite of business opposition, the EEC Commission believes that the 
Multinational Directive will dispel irrational fears of employees by ensuring 
432. /d. 
433. /d. 
434. Business/Union Polarization, supra note 23, at 4. 
435. ETUC Evaluation, supra note 18, at § 1.1. 
436. UNICE POSITION, supra note 95, at para. 5. 
437. See CBI Resists EEC's Disclosure Proposals, Financial Times, Sept. 29, 1980, at 4 (reporting a 
statement by Martin Morton of the Confederation of British Industry (CBI) Social Affairs Direc-
torate - saying the proposed legislation is "formal and rigid"); The Union of EEC Ihdustries 
(UNICE) challenges the legal base of the proposed directive. UNICE says that the Commission 
does not intend to standardize national legislation in this area as authorized by Articles 54(3)(g) 
and 100 ofthe EEC Treaty, but to complement this legislation with a system that does not exist in 
any of the Community's Member States. UNICE: Opposition, supra note 147, at 5. The Commis-
sion chose Article 100 of the EEC Treaty as the legal basis for the Directive because a lack of a 
consistency between information and consultation procedures" [h las a direct effect on the Com-
mon Market and should therefore be remedied by approximating legislation while maintaining 
progress within the meaning of Article 117 of the [EEC] Treaty." EXPLANATORY MEMO, supra 
note 20, § II(B). 
438. UNICE POSITION, supra note 95, at paras. 7-9. 
439. Tapiola, supra note 168, at 292; see HANDBOOK FOR NEGOTIATORS, supra note 156, at 
25-27,34; see also ETUC Evaluation, supra note 18, at § 1.1. 
440. UNICE POSITION, supra note 95, at para. 5. 
441. Id. See also PROGRESS REPORT ON SUPPORT FOR THE OECD GUIDELINES (Mar. 20, 1978) 
(submitted by Business and Industry Advisory Committee of the OECD to the Committee on In-
ternational Investment and Multinational Enterprises), reprinted in R. BLANPAIN: THE OECD 
GUIDELINES FOR MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES AND LABOUR RELATIONS, 1976-1979, at 79 
(1979) (citing widespread compliance with the Guidelines). But the official IME Report stated 
that progress has been made by larger MNEs but that observance of the disclosure standards was 
considerably less widespread among the small and medium MNEs. BLANPAIN: IME REPORT, 
supra note 267, at 98. 
442. UNICE POSITION, supra note 95, at para. 4. 
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transparency.443 The experience of worker participation in Germany, Den-
mark and the Netherlands has shown that the stability created by close con-
tacts between labor and management has actually attracted foreign invest-
ment. 444 
Despite an inclination by business to resist the idea offurther disclosure, the 
best interest of business is to accept disclosure as inevitable. m Public opinion 
in most industrial countries appears to be gathering momentum in favor of 
more disclosure. 448 Resistance to public opinion carries the risk that even 
more excessive demands will be made on MNEs.447 A problem is that labor is 
antagonized by the power of MNEs to transfer production. 448 Labor believes 
that MNEs can and do employ the threat of the use of such power to gain ad-
vantages in negotiations with labor. 449 Contact between management and 
labor with the exchange of information would allow normalization of relations 
between 'the two sides. The settlement of differences and disputesm would 
evolve into a more rational process. 451 
One important purpose of the Multinational Directive is to help foster a 
more stable atmosphere for business investment. m Without losing sight of 
that purpose, measures should be taken to close the gap between management 
and labor by alleviating cost and secrecy problems. Built into the Multina-
tional Directive is a provision assuring confidentiality. m N ationallegislatures 
will consider this provision in implementing the procedures.m Working 
together, labor and business would be able to develop a means of assuring con-
fidentiality. m Costs would also be kept down through cooperation. m If 
MNEs and labor consult with each other, they could ascertain the precise need 
for information and eliminate costly reporting of unnecessary information. m 
IX. CONCLUSION 
This Comment has examined MNEs and the problems encountered by 
organized labor in bargaining with MNE management. These problems have 
developed as a result of MNEs' size and diversity. In Europe, the balance of 
443. S" Commission ProPOSlS Dir"tivI, supra note 71, at 2. 
444. Commission Approv,s Workm Rights Draft, The Times, Oct. 3, 1980, at 23. S" Vr,dling 
Outlin,s Sc0P" supra note 66, at 6. 
445. S" Vagts, Costs oj Illumination, supra note 414, at 337. 
446. BLANPAIN, supra note 52, at 214; s" id. at 316-17, 337. 
447. SIt Vagtl, Costs oj Illumination, supra note 414, at 337. 
448. AMERICAN MULTINATIONALS, supra note 364, at 100-01. 
449. [d.; 111 MULTINATIONAL CHALLENGE, supra note 160, at 34. 
450. S" HELLMAN, supra note 401, at 112. 
451. [d. 
452. S" EXPLANATORY MEMO, supra note 20, S I(A)(4). 
453. Multinational Directive, COM (80) 423 final, art. 15. 
454. !d. arts. 15(2), (3). 
455. SIt Pursey, supra note 12, at 284. 
456. !d. at 281. 
457. !d. 
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power between unions and MNEs has generated concern among government 
and labor organizations. Thus, the EEC is considering binding regulations 
governing MNE labor relations in the form of a proposal for a Multinational 
Directive. This Directive would balance the interests ofMNEs and of labor by 
requiring MNEs to disclose relevant information and to consult with labor 
representatives on matters of substantial interest to worker security. 
This legislation will contribute to stability in industrial relations. Closer 
contacts between management and labor will benefit both sides. The runaway 
plant situation is an application which demonstrates the benefits. Through 
disclosure and consultation, labor will gain security by removal of fear of un-
just job losses. MNEs can expect, through greater understanding between 
both labor and management, that labor will adjust its demands to be increas-
ingly realistic in the context of the international economic area. The present 
polarization of views between labor and management supporters can be recon-
ciled. The best interest of business is to be cooperative. The best interest of 
labor is to help make cooperation inexpensive. Under a rational approach, 
each side can balance its interests with the interests of the other side. Such an 
approach will create a more stable atmosphere for business investment in 
MNEs. 
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